Introduction

Social norms are invariably cited as the other main driver, and social norms theory is widely regarded as an important theoretical tool in efforts to end FGM/C. Put very simply, social norms theory states that people behave as they do because they are conforming to the behavioural norms of their community, largely for fear of ostracisation (Mackie and Lejeune 2009; Mackie et al. 2015). To avoid treading on sensitivities around culture, development agencies now tend to speak of their desire to change social norms, rather than culture. Few scholars have critiqued social norms theory, not least for its failure to produce the desired result – the eradication of FGM/C in countries where development agencies and NGOs have long applied the theory.1 This theory is also applied to many other types of behaviour, which I need not go into here. (Critical scholars include Efferson et al. 2015; Dempsey, McAlaney and Bewick 2018; Graamans 2020.) But a shift appears to be taking place, as more scholars of FGM/C explore alternative theories around social influence and social learning.

This chapter will discuss notions of culture, both in relation to FGM/C and its use in approaches aimed at ending it, notably Alternative Rites of Passage (ARP), a strategy used by NGOs in FGM/C eradication campaigns, largely in East Africa2 Alternative rites have been piloted in a few countries outside East Africa, such as Sierra Leone. But they are not necessarily called ARP. (e.g. Droy et al. 2018; Graamans et al. 2019; Graamans 2020; Hughes 2018; Mepukori 2016; Muhula et al. 2021; Oloo, Wanjiru and Newell-Jones 2011; Prazak 2016, 2007; Van Bavel 2021, 2023 et al., etc.). ARP was first developed from 1996 by NGOs in Kenya in an attempt to offer girls a form of initiation into womanhood that retains cultural elements of the ‘traditional’ ritual, but without FGM/C. There is no single model of ARP. But it usually consists of an education phase for initiates, and culminates in a grand public ceremony that includes a community declaration to abandon FGM/C. NGOs sometimes invite boys to take part too, since there is increasing recognition that engaging boys and men is crucial to ending FGM/C.

Why notions? Because ideas about culture may have little to do with culture per se. ARP is often described as an attempt to preserve culture in initiation processes, while removing the FGM/C element of culture.3 The Anti-FGM Board of Kenya has, with its 2018 ARP Guidelines, attempted to standardise the model of ARP that different NGOs use, but there is no ‘one size fits all’. Graamans et al. also warn: ‘Because the cultural meanings ascribed to [FGM/C] are also evolving, any intervention that is effective at present might become superfluous in the future’ (2019:8). ARP is inappropriate in communities where FGM/C is not linked to girls’ rites of passage, hence it has only been tried in communities where those links exist. (Large public ceremonies celebrating circumcision do not take place in all communities; references to them in this chapter only apply to those where they do or did.) Apart from those around male circumcision, such ceremonies largely disappeared after FGM/C was banned in Kenya and Tanzania.4 I witnessed FGM/C, and the public ceremonies that traditionally followed male and female circumcision, on visits to Tanzanian Maasailand in 1981–2. This was long before Tanzania banned FGM/C in 1998. Kenya banned it in 2011. NGOs have inserted other supposedly cultural elements into the design of ARP ceremonies. Many of these sit awkwardly within a concocted and hybridised event that does not resemble a rite or ritual, yet is purported to be one (Hughes 2018). Conversations with informants in FGM/C-practising communities suggest that few people are fooled by these attempts at simulation. NGOs may claim that the public declaration element of these ceremonies is their most important function, following a model pioneered in Senegal by Tostan.5 The NGO Tostan’s public declarations of community intent to stop practising FGM/C are widely admired. But the declarations are just one part of a long-term strategy, and Tostan does not claim that these alone can alter people’s behaviour. But public pledges to abandon FGM/C have not been shown to work, at least not in East Africa. Some NGOs and development agencies claim otherwise.6 Van Bavel’s informants told her that the February 2019 public declaration in Loita encouraged Maasai to embrace the Loita Rite of Passage because cultural leaders were seen to make it (pers. communication). But this is not borne out by later research findings at that site (Van Bavel et al. 2023). UNFPA-UNICEF maintain that public declarations ‘may change attitudes and potentially reduce FGM’ (2021:22), but provide no evidence. They make similar claims in other annual reports, e.g. referring to public declarations in five Kenyan communities, these were said to have ‘resulted in a total of 1,654 girls declared safe from FGM’ (UNFPA-UNICEF 2020:41). In order to prove that, girls would need to be monitored for at least five years, maybe longer.

It is important to understand the historical continuities in FGM/C eradication efforts. For accounts of the ‘female circumcision crisis’ in colonial Kenya, which arose from missionary attempts to stop the Kikuyu and Meru communities practising FGM/C, see the Introduction to this volume. Most interestingly, in a 1931 article examining the reasons why the Kikuyu community opposed the ban, palaeoanthropologist Louis Leakey suggested ‘an alternative variation on the ceremony of initiation’ which in many ways resembles ARP. He even came up with a proposed curriculum, which included subjects that are now part of ARP curricula (Leakey 1931).8 Leakey proposed a period of instruction for initiates, followed by a public ceremony where they would ‘receive a public and permanently visible sign of their initiation, and their arrival into the status of adulthood’. He suggested this could consist of a small cut on the arm or thigh. Leakey did not support or condemn FGM/C, but ‘deplored’ a total ban (1931:284).