Chapter 6 The Dakar–Bamako Corridor: Between Boom and Contradictions

By focusing on interconnection, Senegal is playing the modernity card, for which mobility has been regarded a watchword for more than a decade.1 Peter Adey, Mobility, London, 2000. Like the new city of Diam-Niadio, the new airport of Ndiass and the Dakar–Thiès–Mbour–Touba motorway, the Dakar–Bamako axis, which has been renamed the ‘corridor’, must in the short term characterise the country’s entry into a new era and highlight a process of radical change, making Dakar an ‘infrastructure metropolis’.2 C. Prélorenzo and D. Rouillard, La Métropole des Infrastructures, Paris, 2009 pp. 189–99.

What works in favour of Senegalese policy-makers, port authorities and international donors (increased traffic and transit along the axis in question) raises a number of questions, however. Aside from the fact that no credible alternative to road transport seems to be in the making, the impact of increased road traffic on the spaces crossed and on towns and villages seems to have barely been taken into account. However, already-old work3 J.-M. Offner, ‘Les « effets structurants » du transport : mythe politique, mystification scientifique’, L’Espace Géographique, 3,‎ 1993, pp. 233–42, has cast doubt on the structural effects of transport infrastructure on the space. More recent analyses highlight the fact that the transport facilities located between central areas and territorial peripheries have deepened inequalities.4 Danny MacKinnon, Gordon Pirie and Matthias Gather, ‘Transport and Economic Development’, in R. Knowles, J. Shaw and I. Docherty (eds), Transport Geographies, Oxford, 2008, pp. 10–28. Olivier Ninot insists on the need for much more empirical work in order to better understand what is being achieved by infrastructure, and what falls under public policy, stakeholder strategies and local decision-making.5 Olivier Ninot, ‘À propos des relations entre transports, territoire et développement’, L’Espace Géographique, 1, 2014, pp. 61–62. Along the Dakar–Bamako Corridor, the question of the growth-generating effects is still being raised. Policy-makers seem to be obscuring it, however, even as traffic increases and the axis polarises economic and social activity.

In this chapter, we will begin by discussing the role of the port of Dakar in Senegal’s economy. We will then look at the current claims about the place occupied by the Dakar–Bamako Corridor in Malian transit and the competition represented by other locations. Finally, we will re-explore the conflicted relationship between the fluidity of international traffic and local development of the spaces crossed by the corridor.

The country then found a new slogan for development: without mobility, there is no salvation. In the name of adjustment programmes, development requires the support of all economic actors and the population to connect the country to the world and locate it on the best international trade and transport routes. In a speech delivered in January 1988, the president of the republic presented the new philosophy guiding the country:

The programme stresses the need for good tertiary services to boost the Senegalese economy in its internationalisation phase in a pragmatic way.

From 2000, investment in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) by the new president of the republic, Abdoulaye Wade, confirmed the Senegalese authorities’ desire to tie the country to Africa as a whole. Conceived as a long-term programme to eradicate poverty and integrate the continent into world trade, NEPAD emphasises the fields of telecommunications and transport, repeatedly stressing the strengthening of infrastructure, improved accessibility, public–private partnerships and regional connections.

It is President Abdoulaye Wade’s intention to strengthen the pre-eminent position of the port of Dakar in West African maritime transport, with the objective of making Dakar a global hub for maritime traffic and a compulsory point of passage for all shipping lines active along the West African coast. The nautical conditions and the situation of the basins on the eastern part of the Cape Verde peninsula are remarkable assets. Modernisation of the port is being led by a director-general who is close to President Wade and has experience working on ports, and who, following foreign leaders in shipping, is driving unprecedented development. Until the early 2000s, the container terminal was mainly reserved for vessels registered by the companies belonging to the Union of Transport Auxiliaries of Senegal, which were Sdv and Saga (subsidiaries of Bolloré), Maersk Sealand, Simar and even Msc. The major new development of the Wade presidency is to break with this past. In 2007, Dubai Port World was awarded the new concession for the terminal for a renewable period of 25 years, with an investment commitment of CFA francs 333 billion (Photo 6.1). International competition requires new arrangements if Dakar’s place in the extensive growth in containerised traffic in Africa is to be consolidated.

In 2012, Dubai Port World began the construction of a new terminal called the ‘Port of the Future’, which will have a capacity of 1.5 million TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units).

The growth of the Senegalese population (from seven million in 1988 to 15.7 million in 2018), especially in the capital (from 1.586 million in 1990 to 3.067 million in 2015), is one of the main drivers behind the development of the port of Dakar.8 Africapolis <www.africapolis.org/data> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. The urban logistics within the agglomeration are an increasing element to which the port must constantly adapt.9 N. Mareï and Olivier Ninot, ‘Transformation des transports en Afrique: Vers des systèmes à plusieurs vitesses?’, Questions Internationales, 90, 2018, pp. 27–31. The other challenge is to consolidate its role in serving Mali. The Ivorian crisis of the 2000s10 In 2002, Côte d’Ivoire was split in two, with its northern part occupied by belligerents considered by the Abidjan authorities to be rebels. Economic activity slowed down and rail transport was interrupted completely. International transit to and from the port of Abidjan was partially suspended until 2003, forcing shipowners to move to other West African ports. stepped up the process of bringing West African ports into competition with each other, leading to the emergence of outgoing Malian traffic from ports in Ghana or Togo.11 ISEMAR, Enjeux et position concurrentielle de la conteneurisation ouest-africaine, 104, 2008, p. 4. The Senegalese Corridor also strengthened its grip on Malian transit, making Dakar the leading service port for Mali (Figure 6.3). Fluctuating between 300,000 and 600,000 tons in the decade beginning in 2000, Malian transit through Dakar jumped after 2010, reaching more than 2.6 million tons today.12 Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Situation Économique et Sociale du Sénégal. Édition 2009, Dakar, 2010; Port Autonome de Dakar, 2013, 2017.

Despite Senegal’s ambitious port policy over the past two decades, the port of Dakar must still constantly seek to strengthen its attractiveness, lest traffic be lost. Notwithstanding the improved local services and remarkable nautical conditions, its location at the heart of an urban fabric limits the possibilities for expansion and hinders its ability to compete with its most serious competitors. A new port is also expected to be established further east in Rufisque Bay. The condition of the road on part of the route connecting Dakar to Bamako (not to mention that of the railway) is variable, increasing transport times and forcing operators to opt for diversifying their logistics solutions and not favouring the Senegalese route at the expense of others.13 Jérôme Lombard, Benjamin Steck and Sidy Cissokho, ‘Les transports sénégalais: Ancrages internationaux et dérives locales’, in M.C. Diop (ed.), Sénégal, 2000–2012: Les institutions et politiques publiques à l’épreuve d’une gouvernance libérale, Dakar, 2013, pp. 642–71. The extension of the motorway to Kaolack (190 kilometres east of Dakar) should reassure operators for a time. Finally, the transit times at the port of Dakar are still a disadvantage for the rapid clearing of containers.

The growth of port traffic in Dakar benefits both the Senegalese national market and Malian trade. The geographical advantage of the Dakar peninsula, which is the first major stopping point for ships operating on the Europe–Africa lines, is accompanied by active lobbying by the port authorities and the Senegalese powers in an extremely competitive West African landscape.

In the last 30 years of the twentieth century, international rail traffic grew significantly (reaching 431,000 tons in 1998). However, operational difficulties coupled with the dilapidated condition of the railway caused accidents and derailments, which resulted in a rapid deterioration in rail activity, and by 2000 traffic had dwindled to 345,700 tons.3 Ministère de l’Équipement et des Transports, Mémento des Transports Terrestres du Sénégal, Dakar, 2002. With the privatisation of the operation in 2003 and its takeover by an international consortium with Canadian and French capital (Canac–Getma), international flows of goods appeared to be rising again – by approximately 9 per cent in 2004, due to an increase in traffic in the Senegal–Mali direction.4 Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Situation Économique et Sociale du Sénégal. Édition 2004, Dakar, 2004. In 2007, Transrail was acquired by the Advens group of Franco-Senegalese businessman Abbas Jaber, and was managed on a day-to-day basis by Vecturis, which specialises in rail transport in Africa. However, the volume of traffic failed to take off, falling below 300,000 tons in 2011,5 Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Situation Économique et Sociale du Sénégal. Édition 2011, Dakar, 2013. and continued to decrease thereafter, to 288,086 tons in 2013, 244,858 tons in 2014, 210,008 tons in 2015 and 74,989 tons in 2016.6 ANSD, Situation Économique et Sociale du Sénégal en 2016, Dakar, 2019. The decrease in freight traffic is creating real financial difficulties for Transrail. See Sidy Dieng, ‘Transrail. Le plan de sauvetage vaut 177 milliards’, Wal Fadjri, 16 May 2012 <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201205161173.html> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. In 2015, operation of the line by Advens was terminated, and in 2016, Transrail was replaced by the Dakar Bamako Railway (DBF), a transitional manager until a permanent solution could be found.7 The fall in international passenger rail traffic has been going on for several decades: in 1998, 41,900 passengers travelled by train between Senegal and Mali, while in 2000, there were only 30,800. Over the period from 1995 to 2007, the decrease was 42%. Since 2018, passenger rail traffic has been totally interrupted on the international line and the internal link between Bamako and Kayes.

Between 2005 and 2012, the total volume transported along this corridor (imports and exports), road and rail combined, increased approximately 2.6 times, from 897,691 tons in 2005 to 2,326,802 tons in 2012. Road transport accounts for almost 90 per cent of Mali’s overall traffic passing through Senegal, compared to 10 per cent by rail. Table 6.1 and Figures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the dominance of road over rail supply.

The advantages of the Dakar–Bamako Corridor are still undeniable. According to importers we interviewed in 2013 as part of a study on the transportation of Senegalese goods by road, the corridor benefited from the Ivorian crisis and the resulting insecurity on the roads.11 State of Senegal and the European Union, 2013. The distance between Bamako and the other ports (Cotonou, Lomé and Accra), which are located about 2,000 kilometres from the Malian capital, is turning into an advantage for Dakar, which is only 1,200 kilometres away. In addition to providing an alternative to the northern corridor, the implementation of the southern corridor (Tambacounda–Kédougou–Saraya–Kita–Bamako) in 2014 shortened the Dakar–Bamako road link to 1,000 kilometres. According to the oil carriers we interviewed, there are also other factors that favour the Senegalese corridor, including the section of road that passes near the gold mines of the Kayes region (which are heavy consumers of diesel) and the reduction in waiting times at the Dakar refinery, which allows four monthly rotations per tanker truck, compared to two in Abidjan.

For almost two decades, the policy adopted by the port of Dakar and the construction of additional roads have consolidated Senegal’s place in trade with Mali. Competition from Abidjan, which is in search of its former glory, is currently below what it might have been until the end of the 1990s. The current challenge for the Dakar–Bamako Corridor is to maintain its attractiveness for international transport operators and the populations residing along its route.

The focus on international infrastructure and the consolidation of international corridors stems from the credit they enjoy in the dominant discourse and the extensive projects envisioned for the continent. International donors and global operators see this as an easy way of duplicating what is being done elsewhere. The corridor is viewed as the only alternative to a lack of international connections. In a sense, the prophecy of the corridor is self-fulfilling, in the words of Robert King Merton, and is also referred to by J.-F. Staszak.5 Robert King Merton, Éléments de théorie et de méthode sociologique, Paris, 1953/1997; Jean-Francois Staszak, ‘Prophéties auto-réalisatrices et géographie’, L’Espace Géographique, 29:2, 2000, pp. 105–19.

The notion of the corridor is presented as one of the elements of the relationship between transport, regional integration and the development process. The corridor promotes institutional integration, which enables the development of international co-operation, the creation of public–private partnerships, and changes in legislation and inter-state agreements. Logistical and economic successes, which are given value by the prevailing narratives about the future of transport in West Africa, establish it as a new paradigm.6 Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia, Infrastructures africaines: Une transformation impérative, Paris, 2010, p. 202; Yann Alix (ed.), Les corridors de transport, Cormelles-le-Royal, 2012. As a ‘programming and governance tool’, it tends to be organised into a functional (and efficient) space, concentrating infrastructures, flows, operators and public and private authorities.7 Jean Debrie and Claude Comtois, ‘Une relecture du concept de corridors de transport: Illustration comparée Europe/Amérique du Nord’, Les Cahiers Scientifiques du Transport, 58, 2010, pp. 127–44. Its operation is reduced to the establishment of simple accelerators of flows: that is, roads connecting two points – in this case capitals such as Dakar, Bamako, Ouagadougou, Abidjan, Accra and Lomé. These continental hubs exert their influence over the entire area being served and ensure the redistribution of goods in their inland areas. The pursuit of the technical–economic logic of corridors leads to territories dominated by fluidity and only slightly structured by the diversity of the transport systems. The example of the Maputo Corridor is emblematic of the development of this type of heavy axis in Africa, which benefits only international trade, and only rarely local traffic.8 Frederik Söderbaum and Ian Taylor (eds), ‘Competing Region-Building in the Maputo Development Corridor’, in F. Söderbaum and Ian Taylor (eds), Afro-Regions: The Dynamics of Cross-Border Micro-Regionalism in Africa, Uppsala, 2008, pp. 35–52.

The corridor is designed by globalised economic actors as a logistical axis, which under optimal conditions must enable flows of traffic and ensure the maximum profitability of these flows, dictated by the needs of both shipping customers and consumers of the products being transported. At the same time, it is presented by institutional leaders as a development tool that benefits the territories crossed and as a resource for improving the accessibility of inhabited areas. There is no guarantee, however, that these populations will notice any positive impact, with the discourse on the structural effects obscuring the negative aspects, which include inconveniences such as pollution and accidents, and even insecurity and land pressures.

In the 1990s, one of Africa’s top transport specialists, the economist Xavier Godard, underlined the importance of linking international and local flows.10 Xavier Godard, ‘Transport local, transport global, quelle articulation ?’ in SITRASS, Efficacité, Compétitivité, Concurrence: la chaîne de transport en Afrique Sub-Saharienne, Lyon-Arcueil, 1996, pp. 339–43. The corridor can aid the process of bringing them together provided that it is not thought of just as a fluid axis of circulation, but is also viewed as an interface space. The existence of secondary intermediate hubs, holders of relay functions (transport, logistics, trade), and the polarisation of jobs and financing is one of the conditions. On the Dakar–Bamako Corridor, the question arises of the role and future of the towns and villages located along the road axis. The life generated by the flows results in a reduction of activities toward the axis, where sustainable human settlements and the seeds of future agglomerations emerge (Koumpentoum in the region of Tambacounda, in Senegal, or Diéma and Didiéni between Kayes and Bamako, in Mali). Corridors become tools of territorial reconfiguration, offering benefits to the territories. On the one hand, there is the possibility that people will benefit from what is circulating by offering numerous goods and services (fuels, various repairs, restoration and accommodation) and, on the other, there is also the potential capacity to meet travellers’ needs at the stops with food products, construction materials, energy resources (for example charcoal) and handicrafts. The growing numbers of trips made by government officials and private companies, and even private vehicles, are creating a traffic market from which the local population can benefit. Finally, being located on a corridor means having easier access to health, education and administrative services.

Another major issue is the destruction of infrastructures. Between Tambacounda and Kedougou, the axis is in poor condition, as it also is between Kedougou and the Malian border.11 See Boubacar Dembo Tamba, ‘Le corridor Dakar–Tambacounda–Bamako via Kédougou se dégrade dans sa partie située entre Niéméniké et Moussala’, Radio Tamba Online, 23 December 2017 <www.tambacounda.info/2017/12/23/corridor-dakar-tambacounda-bamako-via-kedougou-se-degrade-partie-situee-entre-niemenike-moussala/> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. The Kayes Bridge, which spans the Senegal River, has been weakened by uninterrupted truck crossings for almost two decades, as it was not built to take such a high level of traffic. In 2016, it was even closed for reconstruction, forcing vehicles over 40 tons in weight to travel by the southern route.12 Since 2021, a second bridge over the Senegal River relieves the old bridge of part of its traffic. See Aminata Sanou, ‘Inauguration du 2ème pont de Kayes: contribuer à la croissance économique et assurer la continuité du trafic du corridor Dakar-Bamako !’, Maliactu.net, 2 March 2021 <https://maliactu.net/mali-inauguration-du-2eme-pont-de-kayes-contribuer-a-la-croissance-economique-et-assurer-la-continuite-du-trafic-du-corridor-dakar-bamako/> [Accessed 8 June 2021]. The main explanation for this was the systematic overloading of heavy goods vehicles in contravention of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) community regulations (to which Mali and Senegal are subject), in particular regulation 14/2055/CM/WAEMU, on the harmonisation of standards and procedures for the control of the gauges, weights and axle load of haulage vehicles. Overloading is often used to compensate for low freight prices and the almost constant empty return journeys. A 2013 study on the state of road freight transport in Senegal indicated that at the Diam Niadio weighing site at the exit from the Dakar agglomeration, 78 per cent of heavy goods vehicles were overloaded. The same study concluded that the lifespan of the infrastructure has been drastically reduced (from 15 to five years).

The rail transport alternative represents one way of addressing the problem of vehicle overloading and destruction of infrastructure. On the link between Dakar and Bamako, however, despite repeated promises to boost use of the line, no large-scale plan has been envisaged to permit the complete restoration of the track or, presumably, widening it to standard gauge.13 Khadim Mbaye, ‘Macky Sall réitère son plaidoyer pour le développement du ferroviaire en Afrique’, La Tribune Afrique, 25 September 2017 <https://afrique.latribune.fr/finances/investissement/2017–09–25/macky-sall-reitere-son-plaidoyer-pour-le-developpement-du-ferroviaire-en-afrique-751648.html> [Accessed 27 April 2021]; Michel Lachkar, ‘Moderniser la ligne de train Dakar-Bamako, un projet stratégique pour le Sénégal’, franceinfo, 11 August 2018 <www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/senegal/moderniser-la-ligne-de-train-dakar-bamako-un-projet-strategique-pour-le-senegal_3054631.html> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. Moreover, there is nothing that says that the revival of rail transport will benefit the localities crossed or their populations. In fact, the example of the Abidjan–Ouagadougou line, which is operated by SITARAIL, a subsidiary of the Bolloré group, shows the opposite: a reduction in the number of stops at passenger stations and a concentration of investment in freight trains.14 Foussata Dagnogo, ‘Rail-route et Dynamiques Spatiales en Côte d’Ivoire’, unpublished PhD thesis, Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2014. On the Dakar–Bamako line, the impact for the territories has been disastrous: since the takeover of operations by private funds in 2003, residents have complained about the disappearance of the passenger service, which was sometimes the only way available to them to travel outside their isolated region.15 See the two-part film by Julien Merlaud, 2007, who interviewed all the rail transport actors in Mali and investigated the entire Bamako–Kayes train route: Bamako–Kayes Parts I–II, film, Julien Merlaud <www.dailymotion.com/video/x4phtd_bamako-kayes-part1_news> and <www.dailymotion.com/video/x4pgyq_bamako-kayes-part2_news> [both accessed 27 April 2021]. The revitalisation of the line has not been integrated with transport/space interactions in mind, and the only underlying goal has been the fluidity of traffic between the two terminals.

However, Senegal’s territory lies at the ‘tip of the network’, at the far end of the axis from Mali, and thus from central West Africa. Policies to strengthen national infrastructure in the direction of Dakar, coupled with disagreements with The Gambia, Mali and Mauritania, have highlighted Senegal’s focus on itself and contributed towards distancing it from its neighbours, to the point where international land connections remain difficult: the Tambacounda/Malian border axis was only asphalted in 1999 and there is no bridge across to Banjul in The Gambia or to Mauritania, while routes to Guinea or Guinea Bissau are few and in poor condition. Nationally, therefore, Senegal is a country that is turned towards its capital, while at a continental level it is relegated to a peripheral position that is no more favourable in terms of better integration into West African trade than that of landlocked Mali and Burkina Faso, which seem to be more in control.1 See Olivier David, ‘Les Réseaux Marchands Africains face à l’Approvisionnement d’Abidjan’, unpublished PhD thesis, Université Paris X, 1999 on onions from the Sahel exported to the Ivorian economic capital (more than 1,500 kilometres away); Audrey Fromageot, ‘Dépasser l’Enclavement: Le Maraîchage des Savanes et l’Approvisionnement d’Abidjan’, Espace-Populations-Sociétés, 1, 2005, 83–98, on market gardening in the savannas of southern Burkina Faso, the production of which is also intended for Abidjan (more than 700 kilometres away).

On the African chessboard, the question is whether the Senegalese economy can turn the advantage the location of the port of Dakar represents for international sea routes into a permanent asset, and attract global and West African transport operators in spite of competition from other ports such as Abidjan, Tema and Lomé, and soon Nouakchott and Conakry. In addition, the trade between Dakar and Bamako makes an uneven contribution to the development of national territories. While the two cities benefit, other spaces such as landlocked urban neighbourhoods and rural peripheries remain isolated from the advantages that should come with the traffic that passes through them. The rhetoric of the structural effects of infrastructure mobilised by Senegal and donors remains wishful thinking.