9 Houses Built on Copper: The Environmental Impact of Current Mining Activities on ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Zambian Copperbelt Communities

This chapter highlights the historical neglect of mining-related community concerns in the Zambian mining industry since the development of the ‘old’ Copperbelt and compares it to the developments on the ‘new’ Copperbelt. It argues that, despite variations in the ‘nature’ of mining communities and in the approach of mining companies to environmental protection in each, environmental concerns are a significant challenge in both. The chapter suggests that the continuity in ineffective environmental management, and the complex ‘indigenous’ nature of the ‘new’ Copperbelt, means that this region is likely to follow the trajectory of the ‘old’ Copperbelt if environmental management between the state, mining companies and communities is not improved.

The chapter focuses on communities located closest to mine facilities in the country’s most important mining regions, the Copperbelt and the North-Western Province (referred to in this chapter as the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Copperbelts respectively). These communities include former mine compounds in the Copperbelt Province as well as indigenous communities affected by new mining activities in the North-Western Province. It draws on research conducted in the ‘old’ Copperbelt communities of Kankoyo and Butondo in Mufulira and Wusakile and Bwacha in Kitwe. In the ‘new’ Copperbelt, the Kabwela resettlement site in Solwezi’s Kansanshi mine area is included in the study along with the Northern and Southern/Shinengene resettlement sites in Kalumbila. By comparing the two mining regions, the chapter highlights the importance of variations in mine ownership, length of existence and land ownership patterns within the two regions, and their implications for mining investment and environmental management.

Soon after nationalising the mining industry in 1969, Zambia experienced a major economic crisis that resulted from the oil and copper price crises beginning in the mid-1970s.5 M. M. Burdette, ‘The Mines, Class Power and Foreign Policy in Zambia’, Journal of Southern African Studies 10, 2 (1984), pp. 208–9; T. M. Shaw, ‘Zambia: Dependence and Underdevelopment’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 10, 1 (1976), p. 14; M. Ndulo, ‘Mining Legislation and Mineral Development in Zambia’, Cornell International Law Journal 19 (1986), p. 7. This had severe consequences for environmental management, as global concerns for natural resource protection were just emerging in the 1970s, and gained momentum in the 1980s.6 For more information on global natural resource conservation efforts during the 1970s and 1980s, see E. Vasseur, ‘United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972’, Water Research 7, 8 (1973), pp. 1227–33 and I. Borowy, Defining Sustainable Development for our Common Future: A History of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission) (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 3. These global developments were important for resource-rich countries like Zambia, in which natural resource exploitation formed the basis of the economy. By the early 1980s, the country was the fifth largest copper producer in the world and held 6% of the world’s reserves, necessitating effective mineral resource management and environmental regulation.7 For a detailed understanding of the Act, see Government of the Republic of Zambia, National Conservation Strategy, 1985.

The increased international pressure for environmental conservation influenced local legislation, beginning with the enactment of the Natural Resources Act in 1970. Although not specific to the mining industry, the Act marked a significant step towards environmental protection in post-independence Zambia. Soon thereafter, in 1985, the government enacted the National Conservation Strategy.8 Ibid., p. 13. Among the Act’s greatest weaknesses was poor implementation due to limited funding availability.9 By this time, the Zambian Government could not fund the implementation of the Act. Therefore, the Dutch and Swedish governments provided funding for its implementation while the International Union, comprised of various civil society and government members to promote sustainable natural resources use, provided technical assistance. N. J. Bennett, Robin Roth, Sarah C. Klain, Kai M. A. Chan, et al., ‘Mainstreaming the Social Sciences in Conservation’, Conservation Biology 31, 1 (2017), pp. 56–66. Like the National Resources Act before it, the National Conservation Strategy was a ‘general’ conservation Act with limited benefits for specific industries such as the mining industry.

Environmental and conservation laws enacted between the 1970s and early 1980s were not specific to mining and this undermined environmental management within mining communities. This was compounded by the fact that mining companies focused on the health and safety of workers within the mines rather than in the communities outside the mines. Efforts at addressing the health and safety of workers within the mines included blasting and explosives legislation aimed at preventing blasting-related accidents, factory regulations, as well as first-aid regulations and competitions.10 For more details on specific health and safety measures, see variously ZCCM-IH, 12.8.5A, Legislation May 1970 to December 1975; National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ), MM1-9-1, Explosives Regulations and ML8-7-27, Mining Regulations. The emphasis on accident prevention and mine safety by mining companies was intended to facilitate production. Despite the significance of safety concerns for mineworkers, environmental safety outside the work environment was equally important given its impact on the livelihoods of workers and their families. Furthermore, addressing mining pollution outside the workplace was important given the possibility of the occurrence of unforeseen incidents, such as accidents during the transportation of hazardous substances to offsite locations and subsequent contamination of the areas surrounding these ‘outside’ locations. In addition to this, mine facilities were often spread out across a town, creating additional safety concerns. In, Kitwe, for example, waste facilities belonging to Nkana Mine are spread out across the town. Uchi and Kitwe tailings facilities are located far from the mine’s mineral extraction site, that is situated on the south-western edge of Kitwe, while Nkana East residential area lies between the two waste facilities and is therefore prone to pollution from the two sites.11 Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Investments Holdings and Misenge Environmental Technical Services, ‘Copperbelt Environment Plan, Nkana Environmental Impact Assessment’ (2003), pp. 11–12. Given the possibility of offsite mine locations, effective management of communities located around mines was necessary.

The Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act (EPPCA) of 1990 was the final environmental legislation enacted by the United National Independence Party before they were ousted from power by the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy in 1991.12 For specific provisions of the Act see Government of the Republic of Zambia, ‘The Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act’, Chapter 204 of the Laws of Zambia. Compared with previous laws, the Act had greater impact and enabled the enactment of additional environmental laws, as well as the establishment of the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) and the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources.13 Ibid. The Council was a statutory body tasked with environmental protection and pollution control to improve the health and welfare of both humans and their surroundings.14 For more on ECZ see P. T. Sambo, ‘The Environmental Management Act (2011): A Basis for the Growth of an Environmental Ethos and Good Environmental Governance in Zambia?’ in A. Paterson, Law, Environment, Africa (Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2019), pp. 647–64 and Colin N. Boocock, ‘Environmental Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment in the Mining Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (Paris: OECD, 2002), pp. 25–6. The organisation’s mission was to ensure a pollution-free environment in Zambia through the enforcement of the EPPCA. It also undertook research on natural resource and environmental use, disseminated information on natural resources and environmental management and advised the state on environmental management and policy. These functions were performed through the Pollution Control Inspectorate and the Planning and Information Management Unit.15 Interview, Misenge Technical Services employee, Kalulushi, 6 November 2018. In 2011, ECZ transformed into Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) through the Environmental Management Act enacted in the same year.16 Government of the Republic of Zambia, ‘The Environmental Management Act of 2011’. The organisation maintained the functions of its predecessor.

Despite the new laws of the early 1990s, the government’s ability to effectively implement this legislation was limited by the severe financial constraints of the time, as well as the transition to multi-party democracy and a resultant reduction in state capacity, which negatively influenced policy-making processes.17 M. Larmer, Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 4–5. Furthermore, legislation was not specific to mining but addressed general environmental protection. For example, the EPPCA provided for public involvement in environmental management, but did not provide specific guidelines for how this was to be achieved in specific sectors such as mining.18 For specific provisions of the EPPCA see Government of the Republic of Zambia, ‘The Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act’, Chapter 204 of the Laws of Zambia. This particular omission was disadvantageous for mining communities, as it excluded the most affected members of the public from participating in environmental dialogue.

As a result of inadequate legislation, economic and political challenges, as well as the government’s generally low prioritisation of environmental protection, it was Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) that spearheaded environmental management within and outside the mines.19 The nationalisation of the Zambian mines was announced in 1969, while ZCCM was formed in 1982 following the merging of Roan Consolidated Copper Mines (RCCM) and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM): J. Lungu, ‘Copper Mining Agreements in Zambia: Renegotiation or Law Reform?’ Review of African Political Economy 35, 117 (2008), pp. 403–15, p. 404. By the early 1990s, ZCCM had already established environmental management practices on the ‘old’ Copperbelt. Established several years after the formation of ZCCM, ECZ therefore benefitted from the mining company’s environmental strategies.20 Interview, Misenge Environmental Technical Services employee, 25 October 2018; R. Douthwaite, M. Chitalu and C. Lungu, ‘Zambia National Environment Situational Analysis Report’, Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (2005), p. 1; C. Mulenga, ‘Judicial Mandate in Safeguarding Environmental Rights from the Adverse Effects of Mining Activities in Zambia’, Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 22, 1 (2019), p. 8. Evidence suggests that environmental monitoring activities were undertaken by ZCCM both within and beyond its premises. For example, ZCCM conducted re-vegetation projects around dam walls and surface dumping several years before the statutory body engaged in environmental monitoring on the ‘old’ Copperbelt.21 D. Limpitlaw and T. Woldai, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment of Mining by Integration of Remotely Sensed Data with Historical Data’, Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Mine Environmental Engineering held at Brunei University, London 28–31 July 1998. Other strategies included garden refuse management, capping with topsoil to encourage the growth of vegetation and radiation waste management.22 Interview, METS employee, Kalulushi, 6 November 2018. In 1994, ZCCM formed a unit called the Group Environmental Services to enhance environmental protection efforts by overseeing environmental monitoring at the various mines.23 Ibid.

The disadvantage of the state’s limited involvement in environmental regulation was that ZCCM was not held accountable for environmental pollution that was not publicised or considered to be severe. Instead, the government praised the company’s environmental achievements despite their own limited participation in the process and subsequent limited knowledge about the extent of pollution. Outlining ZCCM’s various achievements in environmental protection in 1985, the government stated:

However, the extent to which ZCCM was effective in environmental management remains unclear. Given the magnitude of the environmental damage that was later revealed to have existed on the ‘old’ Copperbelt, it is likely that these positive accounts of effective environmental management are exaggerated, reflecting a nostalgic longing for the nationalised industry.25 For more information on nostalgic longing among Copperbelt residents after privatisation, see P. Mususa, ‘There Used to Be Order: Life on the Copperbelt After the Privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines’, PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014, pp. 8, 14–15, 30; M. Larmer, ‘Permanent Precarity: Capital and Labour in the Central African Copperbelt’, Labour History 58, 2 (2017), pp. 170–72. In fact, as the above quote indicates, pollution of rivers by mine waste was considered a ‘normal’ aspect of the industry. Furthermore, sulphur dioxide pollution was already a significant concern during the early 1990s. In 1992 and 1993, for example, sulphur dioxide results in Mufulira indicated that emissions were higher than the stipulated standards for most of the year. This was especially the case at Clinic 5 in Kankoyo, which provides health services to those living close to the mine smelter.26 ZCCM-IH, 5.14.5B, 5.14.5B Miscellaneous, 1970 to 1995¸ Sulphur Emissions at Mufulira. The limited concern despite evidence of severe pollution suggests that mining-induced pollution was considered ‘acceptable’ to some extent.

In fact, it was the Zambian Government, despite its own limited involvement in mining-related environmental protection in the decades preceding privatisation, that pointed out the dilapidation of the mine’s outside premises, arguing that infrastructure was generally poorly maintained. This was denied by ZCCM, who insisted on the effectiveness of their containment efforts.6 ZCCM-IH, 4.2.3J, ‘Privatisation File July 1994 to March 1996, Comments on Strategic Options for the Privatisation of ZCCM Limited’, p. 9. The extent of pollution on the ‘old’ Copperbelt by the end of the 1990s highlights the severe impact of poor coordination between the Zambian Government and ZCCM on environmental safety on the Copperbelt, as well as its adverse consequences on mining communities.

Following privatisation, ZCCM was reduced to a holding company, Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines Investments Holding (ZCCM-IH), with minority shares in the privatised companies. In 2000, Nkana and Mufulira mines were purchased by the Swiss company Glencore, jointly forming Mopani Copper Mines (MCM) Plc.7 S. Kangwa, ‘Report on the Privatisation of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines’, Copperbelt University (2001), p. 13. As part of the privatisation negotiations, the Zambian Government was forced to accept responsibility for the environmental liabilities that had accrued during previous decades of mining. This was reflected in the development agreements (DAs) that were signed between the state and investors.8 J. Lungu, ‘Socio-Economic Change and Natural Resource Exploitation: A Case Study of the Zambian Copper Mining Industry’, Development Southern Africa 25, 5 (2008), p. 544. Investors were exempted from both environmental liabilities and penalties on condition that the level of emissions did not exceed previous emission levels under ZCCM.

The DAs also included a stability clause granting investors exemptions of between 15 and 20 years, during which the state could neither alter nor terminate the provisions of the agreements.9 Cuthbert C. Makondo, Sydney Sichilima, Matthews Silondwa, Richard Sikazwe, Lombe Maiba et al., ‘Environmental Management Compliance, Law and Policy Regimes in Developing Countries: A Review of the Zambian Case’, International Journal of Environmental Protection and Policy 3, 4 (2015), p. 80. This adversely affected environmental management within the mining industry, given the extensive length of time granted to investors to operate with limited controls over pollution and the fact that the state and ZCCM-IH bore responsibility for severe environmental liabilities, which have not been fully addressed to date.10 In 2002, the Zambian Government founded the Copperbelt Environment Project (CEP). The initial timeframe for the completion of the CEP was 2008. However, when the project finally ended in 2011, some of the environmental liabilities taken on by the government and ZCCM-IH remained unresolved and remain so to date. See, ZCCM-IH METS, ‘Copperbelt Environmental Project’; P. Sinkamba, ‘Technical and Financial Proposal for Sustainability of the Copperbelt Environment Project in Zambia’ (MPhil Dissertation, University of Stellenbosch, 2007). This means there are still significant environmental challenges for communities on the ‘old’ Copperbelt, where current concerns encompass both ongoing and historical environmental issues. This highlights that environmental management was not prioritised by the Zambian Government during privatisation. These challenges are examined in the following sections.

Nevertheless, the efforts made by MCM do augment otherwise limited government efforts to improve the state of mining communities. For example, to address water and sanitation needs within Kankoyo and Butondo, the company provides several water points within the compounds. The number of such points is, however, insufficient to meet community needs. Furthermore, the commercial utility companies are unable to provide safe running water throughout the day. According to community members, locals therefore rely on the polluted river that runs through part of the mine and the community.13 Interviews, anonymised, Mufulira, 2 November 2018. Regular water quality tests are conducted by MCM to prevent contamination of public water bodies.14 Interview, Mopani Copper Mines Environmental Department employee, Mufulira, 8 November 2018. Despite these efforts, contamination of public water sources remains an ever-present concern for both the mining company and residents.

The challenges in service provision are partly created by the failure of the national government to enact effective legislation to safeguard mining communities, or to maintain adequate service provision to communities. In their defence, Copperbelt municipal councils argue that effective service provision has been hindered by limited support from national leaders. Municipal councils also argue that the mushrooming informal settlements on the Copperbelt have increased pressure on already limited resources. In this regard, politicians reportedly contribute to this problem by permitting the legalisation of informal settlements in order to register additional voters for elections, at the expense of quality service provision.15 ZCCM-IH, METS, Volume 2.5, Mufulira Environmental Impact Assessment (2003), p. 56. With regards to the severe mining-induced challenges on the Copperbelt, however, officials from Mufulira’s Department of Government Planning suggest that, despite the shared social responsibility that mine companies have for these communities, it is difficult to hold them to account due to the provisions of the legally enforceable DAs.16 Interview, anonymised, Mufulira, 13 November 2018.

Today, individual homeowners are legally responsible for house maintenance. However, many residents appear not to agree with this, believing that MCM is partly responsible for their condition and renovation, owing to ongoing mining activities.18 Interviews, Kankoyo residents, November 2018. One Member of Parliament (MP) suggested that the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development should be involved in maintaining former townships alongside local councils in order to bridge the gaps in service provision.19 National Assembly of Zambia, Parliamentary Debates for the First Session of the Ninth Assembly, 8 February 2001. This, however, was never implemented and the local municipal councils remained solely responsible for the former mine townships.

The regulation of some historical challenges on the ‘old’ Copperbelt draws from national legislation that does not directly relate to environmental protection within the mining industry. For example, collapsed houses in one of Mufulira’s mining communities benefitted from the Disaster Management Act of 2010. The Act provides strategies for the management of disaster situations, as determined by the Office of the Vice President of Zambia, and the organisation of relief and recovery from disasters. Through the Act’s provisions, the Office of the Vice President provided tents to Kankoyo residents whose homes collapsed from extreme mine-induced cracking.20 Interview, anonymised, Mufulira, 2 November 2018. Although many have stayed in the tents for longer than planned, this measure has at least prevented victims from becoming homeless.

The privatisation of the mining industry highlighted the severity of pollution due to the exemptions granted to foreign investors, chief among them the exemption from penalties for pollution that did not exceed those emitted under ZCCM mines. One of the most severe environmental concerns on the ‘old’ Copperbelt is air pollution through the emission of sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere. Historically, air pollution has been of concern in both Kitwe and Mufulira.23 ZCCM-IH, METS, ‘Copperbelt Environment Project, Counterpart Environmental Management Plan’, p. 38. Air pollution is particularly prevalent in Mufulira, where sulphur dioxide fumes, which locals call senta, have had a particularly significant effect. In 2007, Mufulira residents pleaded with MCM to end hazardous senta emissions.24 Mopani Copper Mines Plc., ‘Mufulira Mine, Environmental Project Brief for the Smelter Upgrade Project’ (2004). Local schoolchildren wrote letters to Glencore, requesting that the investor address the problem.25 Facing Finance, ‘Glencore: Severe Health and Environmental Damages’, 29 November 2011, www.facing-finance.org/en/database/cases/severe-health-and-environmental-damages-mopani-copper-mines-plcschwere-gesundheits-und-umweltschaeden-mopani-copper-mines-plc (accessed 14 October 2020). This campaign resulted in the construction of a new smelter by Mopani Mine, in the same year, that reportedly captured 50% of the emissions from the smelting process. However, community concern peaked in 2009, when ECZ reported that sulphur dioxide emissions from the mine were up to 70 times in excess of those stipulated by the World Health Organization.26 Rob Davies, ‘Glencore Court Ruling in Zambia May Trigger New Pollution Claims’, The Guardian, 18 September 2016.

Owing to local complaints and trade union action, pollution claims were investigated by ZEMA and the mining company’s mining licence was briefly suspended in 2012, although no severe measures followed.27 Misheck Wangwe and Gift Chanda, ‘MUZ Challenges Mopani to End Leaching Mine Pollution’, The Post, 9 March 2012; Facing Finance, ‘Glencore: Severe Health and Environmental Damages’. In 2014, MCM constructed a sulphuric acid plant, close to Kankoyo. The plant captures approximately 97% of the sulphur dioxide previously emitted.28 Facing Finance, ‘Glencore: Severe Health and Environmental Damages’. Representatives from the mine’s Environmental Department report a tremendous decrease in the level of sulphur dioxide fumes emitted. However, residents do not share these perceptions and suggest that pollution has in fact worsened because, although they can no longer see the ‘acid fumes’, they only realise that senta has been released into the atmosphere when they experience the stinging sensation in their eyes and choking effect that is associated with it.29 Interviews, residents of Kankoyo and Butondo, Mufulira, 2018. Reports of respiratory complications, unconsciousness and death have continued despite the construction of the acid plant. Among the most severe cases since the plant was built are the suffocation of seven people in 2014, and the death of a prominent local politician in 2016.30 Government of the Republic of Zambia, High Court of Zambia Civil Jurisdiction Between Geofrey Elliam Mithi and Mopani Copper Mines Plc., 9 June 2016. The latter case particularly raised public attention. The victim’s widower sued Mopani when the post-mortem report indicated that her death was linked to acute respiratory failure resulting from inhalation of toxic fumes. Despite MCM’s attempt to cite the environmental indemnity agreements covering its operations, the court dismissed this on the basis that the sulphur dioxide emissions had exceeded legal limits. The deceased’s widower received K400,000 (then worth about £30,000) in compensation.31 Ibid.; Facing Finance, ‘Glencore: Severe Health and Environmental Damages’.

In recent years, contestations have focused on the Kitwe dump, which is 90% owned by the Nkana Alloy and Smelting Company. However, disputes prevail over ownership of the remaining 10%. In 2013, illegal mining began operating on the premises and in 2018 the contested 10% stake was eventually granted to local small-scale miners known as Jerabos.34 Lusaka Times, ‘Mining at Kitwe’s Black Mountain Resumes’, 6 October 2018. In the same year, however, part of the Kitwe black mountain collapsed, resulting in the death of ten people and injuries to eight more.35 National Assembly of Zambia, Statement by the Minister of Mines and Minerals Development, 21 June 2018; Business Day, ‘Subsistence Miners Die after Black Mountain Mine Dump Collapses in Zambia’, 20 June 2018; Zambia Daily Mail, ‘Black Mountain Accident National Disaster’, 23 June 2018.An additional eight people were injured in the accident. The incident was caused when surface excavators collapsed, blocking the escape of miners who were working underground. The incident was one of the worst in the Zambian mining industry since the Mufulira mine disaster of 1971 and was declared a national disaster.36 Ibid.. In addition to such a direct threat to the lives of miners, the black mountain has contributed to air, soil and noise pollution and the cracking of houses in nearby Wusakile due to blasting operations.37 Interviews with residents of Wusakile, Kitwe, 2018. Despite the blatant safety risk posed, the site remains operational.

The situation at the Mufulira ‘black mountain’ is different, given that ‘mining’ has not commenced there. However, similar conflicts have arisen concerning its ownership. In 2018, residents from various communities in Mufulira, particularly those located closest to the slag dump, marched to the municipal council offices to seek to determine the dump’s ‘rightful’ beneficiaries. Two weeks later, Kankoyo residents held a community meeting at which they asserted their ownership of the dump.38 Kankoyo Community Meeting, 10 November 2018. Although the government has yet to decide on this issue, the conflict demonstrates the complexity of community responses to environmental issues on the ‘old’ Copperbelt. It highlights how residents affected by proximity to mine hazards respond to the perceived injustice of ‘outsiders’ benefitting from potential resources within their communities. According to Kankoyo residents, the air and soil pollution they experience as a result of the presence of the slag dump gives them the right to exploit the resource, which should not be shared by others, not even with other residents of Mufulira.

In addition, the lack of infrastructural development and community investment in Solwezi and the limited development of Kansanshi mine during the ZCCM era had negative consequences for local communities, as local residents attest. Consequently, the area remained a labour reserve for migrant labour to the Copperbelt, as it had been during the colonial period.4 Negi, ‘“You cannot make a Camel Drink Water”’, p. 241. Negi asserts that Solwezi town developed as a small administrative centre, rather than one whose existence focused on mining activities.5 Ibid., p. 243. Solwezi residents were disappointed with the slow development of mining in the area and desired the levels of development associated with the more prosperous ‘old’ Copperbelt mines. They may however have been unaware of the environmental challenges associated with mining. The expansion of mining in the North-Western Province since the mid-2000s initiated the desired development, but also brought about environmental problems.

During privatisation, Kansanshi mine was initially sold to Cyprus Amax Minerals Company.6 In 1999 the Phelps Dodge Corporation bought Cyprus Amax. Kangwa, ‘Report on the Privatisation’, p. 13; H. I. Torrealday, ‘Mineralization and Alteration of the Kansanshi Copper Deposit – Zambia’, Master’s Thesis, University of Colorado, 2000; M. Hansungule, P. Feeney and R. H. Palmer, ‘Report on Land Tenure Insecurity on the Zambian Copperbelt’ (Lusaka: Oxfam, 1998), p. 62. This created the prospect of development of the area but, only one year later, Cyprus Amax announced plans to close the mine in order to facilitate exploration works.7 Hansungule at al., ‘Report on Land Tenure’, p. 62. After two months, the company announced plans to demolish houses and other infrastructure within the mine’s licensed area, to facilitate exploration works.8 National Assembly of Zambia, Parliamentary Debates for the First Session of the Ninth Assembly, 8 February 2001. The destruction of local infrastructure was alarming for Solwezi residents, particularly those who lost houses and farm plots in the process. Local MPs from both opposition and ruling parties presented the grievances of Solwezi residents to the National Assembly in 2001.9 Ibid. According to one of them, Benny Tetamashimba, the destruction of infrastructure had left behind a ‘bare’ town. Local politicians complained that these developments had placed them in a difficult position with locals, who constantly demanded an explanation for the mining company’s actions:

By demolishing infrastructure to facilitate mining expansion, Cyprus Amax contributed to the underdevelopment of an already poorly developed region. The mine was however then purchased by FQM in 2001 and production commenced in 2005.11 Interview, anonymised, Kalumbila, 18 October 2017; R. Kapesa, J. Mwitwa and D. C. Chikumbi, ‘Social Conflict in the Context of the Development of New Mining Concessions in Zambia’, Southern African Peace and Security Studies 4, 2 (2015), pp. 41–62. Kalumbila Mine, also owned by FQM, began commercial production more recently in 2015. This again raised local expectations. Locals believed that the mine would provide much needed employment that would enable them to improve their socio-economic status, and that the presence of a flourishing mine would facilitate improvements in infrastructure and social service provision, as well as the growth of additional industries to serve the needs of mine employees.12 Interviews, residents of Solwezi and Kalumbila, 2017–18.

In North-Western Province, interactions between mining investors and customary leaders controlling land access have sometimes proved problematic. For example, in 2010 FQM’s Kalumbila Minerals Limited acquired 518 square kilometres of land from the local Lunda Senior Chief Musele.14 ‘Chipata, Kasama, Solwezi and Mongu to be Transformed into Cities – Lungu’, Lusaka Times, 2 March 2015. This was in excess of the 250 hectares of customary land that a chief can grant, according to Zambian law. Although the state contested the agreement, FQM officially announced that commercial production was underway in 2016.15 Interview, anonymised, Kalumbila, 18 October 2017; Kapesa et al., ‘Social Conflict’, pp. 41–62; Mining Watch Canada, ‘Agreement between His Royal Highness Senior Chief Musele and Kalumbila Minerals Limited for the Acquisition of Surface Rights within the Chiefdom of Senior Chief Musele for the Trident Project of Approximately 518 Square Kilometres’ (2010), https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/fqm-musele-agreement-dated-14-july-2011_1.pdf (accessed 16 June 2019).

Despite strong rural customs in North-Western Province, the new urban areas that have emerged around Kansanshi mine and the newly constructed Kalumbila town resemble developments on the ‘old’ Copperbelt during its heyday. The developments at Kalumbila for example include a housing project, and educational, health and recreational facilities.16 Observations based on fieldwork conducted in Kalumbila between 2017 and 2019. Reflecting this urbanisation, President Edgar Lungu announced in 2015 that Solwezi was one of four Zambian towns that would be given the status of cities.17 ‘Chipata, Kasama, Solwezi and Mongu’, Lusaka Times. Modern residential areas have emerged across the wider province in proximity to new mines. These include the Kabitaka Hills Housing Project, the Kalumbila town residences, as well as the Golf Estates at Kansanshi and Kalumbila. The settlements include school and health facilities. However, the Golf Estates are up-market residences that also include golf courses, international schools, wildlife viewing and clubhouses with restaurant and sports facilities. Within the Kansanshi mine premises, a second and reportedly more exclusive clubhouse is under construction as of 2020. The dam along which it will be built is only several hundred metres away from the Kabwela resettlement community (see discussion below) and within full view of its residents. Access to the Golf Estate and other mine facilities, including some private schools, is strictly controlled, and therefore most Solwezi residents have not seen these facilities; many are unaware of their existence. On the other hand, the Kabitaka and Kalumbila town houses provide more modest but decent accommodation with a small garden. The houses range from two to four bedroomed houses and it is here that most skilled and semi-skilled mineworkers and contractors reside. Despite these variations in mine housing facilities, most of these facilities are only accessible to a small elite, largely excluding most of the local population who cannot afford them. Interaction between Kabitaka and Kalumbila residents and outsiders is easily facilitated by unrestricted access to the premises. This contrasts sharply with the relationship between the more overtly ‘gated’ Golf Estates, which are not the subject of this chapter, and the broader Kansanshi and Kalumbila communities discussed here.

Kalumbila Mine’s denial of mining-induced pollution is consistent with FQM’s environmental policy, which claims that the company is committed to pollution prevention, legal compliance, environmental protection, sound environmental mining practices, and responsible management of mining waste and mining products.20 First Quantum Minerals, ‘Environmental Policy,’ 2011; Interview, J. Ngwira, Kalumbila, 15 October 2017. According to Kalumbila Mine’s Environmental Manager Joseph Ngwira, FQM subscribes to internationally accepted guidelines in order to augment in-house and national environmental guidelines, including the Equator Principles and ISO 14001.21 Ibid. In line with its environmental policy, FQM has introduced mining processes that are reportedly ‘safer’ than those previously employed on the ‘old’ Copperbelt. Examples include the recycling of waste oil in order to reduce hazardous waste. New storage facilities help reduce the use of hydrocarbons. Similarly, enclosing milling and crushing facilities prevents air pollution. Furthermore, the use of electric-powered shovels instead of diesel excavators reduces fossil fuel consumption and resultant carbon emissions.22 Interview, J. Ngwira, Kalumbila, 15 October 2017. Other sustainable strategies include re-vegetation of eroded mine sites and wildlife conservation within mine premises.23 Ibid; interview, anonymised, Kalumbila, 18 October 2017; First Quantum Minerals Limited, Environmental and Safety Data Report (2018), p. 13.

Despite the positive image painted by FQM’s environmental policy and its denial of environmental pollution claims by locals, mining companies tend to exaggerate their environmental achievements, just as locals may exaggerate the impact on their communities. Furthermore, the danger mining poses to the environment means that community concerns regarding pollution cannot be entirely dismissed by FQM. In addition, the ‘newness’ of these mines means that the full effects of mining on the environment may lie in the future. Makondo et al. suggest that environmental, ecological and public health challenges similar to those on the ‘old’ Copperbelt and in Kabwe can be expected to occur in this region.24 Makondo et al. ‘Environmental Management Compliance’, p. 80. Lindahl suggests that the newer mines are likely to contribute even more severely to air pollution in the region, given the construction of a new smelter at Kansanshi.25 J. Lindahl, Environmental Impacts of Mining in Zambia: Towards better Environmental Management and Sustainable Exploitation of Mineral Resources, Geological Survey of Sweden Report, 22 (2014), p. 6. In addition, groundwater pollution will largely affect a significant area given the location of the ‘new’ Copperbelt within both the Zambezi and Kafue River basins.26 Ibid., pp. 10–11; Makondo et al., ‘Environmental Management Compliance’, p. 80.

Despite the pollution concerns that have arisen in the North-Western Province, national regulators downplay the possible environmental damage that may result from these mining activities. A ZEMA official noted:

The disparities between environmental reports produced by government regulators, mining company representatives and the public, highlight a major challenge in environmental regulation, which is that pollution is perceived differently by those who regulate it and those who experience it. Locals tend to exaggerate the effects of mining activities, for example attributing low crop yields to the impact of mining, despite the fact that these are consistent with those obtained before the mines reopened. However, mine management and regulators’ denial that pollution has occurred leads to de-prioritisation of environmental protection efforts, despite a clear understanding of the consequences of mining for the environment.

Within the context of extractive industries, displacement is often justified by the supposed benefits of large-scale investment. As Butler asserts,

Resettlement disrupts the social and economic order of communities, creating socio-economic changes that undermine pre-existing livelihoods. Furthermore, relocation may result in feelings of loss and nostalgia for residents’ previous communities.3 Interviews, residents of New Israel, Northern Settlement and Shinengene, Kalumbila, 2017–19. Despite this, Askland argues that community displacement has the potential to ease experiences of loss and dislocation.4 H. H. Askland, ‘A Dying Village: Mining and the Experiential Condition of Displacement’, Extractive Industries and Society 5, 2 (2018), pp. 230–36, p. 232. Using the example of Wollar, a village in North-Western Australia around which coal mining has gradually expanded since the 1970s, Askland argues that feelings of loss and disruption are common in villagers who reside within affected communities and are daily ‘reminded of the uneven battle that has played out in their village and the loss they have endured’, whereas those who move away from this region do not experience similar emotions.5 Ibid., p. 233. This analysis is both true and false in the case of the Zambian mining industry. Relocation from affected communities may indeed ease feelings of loss and dislocation. In the case of Kankoyo for example, the relocation of the community would provide relief from the constant effects of continued mining pollution.

On the ‘old’ Copperbelt, some residents of communities such as Kankoyo are willing to relocate voluntarily. Such residents look to the example of the relocation of Mufulira’s Zambia Railways Compound after 2005. This project was funded by the World Bank and Nordic Support Fund to support the Zambian Government in addressing the environmental degradation and social impact of historic mining activities.6 ZCCM-IH, METS, ‘Copperbelt Environment Plan, Counterpart Environmental Management Plan’, vol. 1 (2003), p. 7. The Copperbelt Environment Project identified the relocation of the railway operations as a major priority, as it was experiencing severe housing subsidence due to MCM’s activities.7 ZCCM-IH, METS, ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc, ‘Preparation of Phase 2 of a Consolidated Environmental Management Plan, Project Summary Report’ (2005), p. ii. The community has since been resettled successfully along the Mufulira-Congo Road. In the case of Kankoyo, resettlement plans were initially drawn up several decades ago, when mining expansion after independence led the government to consider relocating the entire town further away from the mining site.8 Interviews, Mufulira Municipal Council employees, November 2018. However, the project was never implemented. Kankoyo’s houses have long passed their original envisaged life span of 50 years, which partly explains their current dilapidation.9 Interview, anonymised, Mufulira, 13 November 2018.

Although the relocation of Mufulira’s Zambia Railways community seems to be a success story, the same cannot be said for the resettled communities on the ‘new’ Copperbelt. Prior to the reopening of Kansanshi mine under FQM management, the mine initially occupied a relatively small area. According to a senior resident of Mushitala area, Mrs Nkole, and the customary leader of the Kabwela community, Mr Kakonde, several small villages stood on land which now forms part of the mine premises. Locals cultivated various crops including maize, sweet potatoes and groundnuts for subsistence. When the mine reopened under FQM, mining development necessitated the expansion of the mine’s territory. These villagers were offered compensation in exchange for their departure, while a minority willingly opted to sell their land to FQM in order to earn some money.10 Interviews, Mr Kakonde, Solwezi, 15 December 2017 and Mrs Nkole, Solwezi, 12 August 2016.

The relocated Kabwela community is located about five kilometres from the mine entrance along its boundary. It provides an excellent case study for the impact of mining on neighbouring communities, owing to its proximity to mine facilities such as dumping and extraction sites. Kabwela community is not an entirely new settlement. It was first established in 1996 as a small village under the current Senior Group Leader’s uncle, who held a similar position. The community, comprised of not more than ten residents, was under the jurisdiction of Chief Kapijimpanga. When people were displaced from what is now Kansanshi mine premises, some joined Kabwela community as ‘resettled villagers’.11 Interview, Mr Kakonde, Solwezi, 15 December 2017. For this reason, and given FQM’s involvement in service provision at the time of resettlement, the community is considered to be a resettled one. Kabwela now has a population of approximately 1,800 people.12 Ibid.

In Kalumbila District, the Northern and Southern/Shinengene settlements were created when FQM acquired customary land for the development of the mining project in 2010.13 Interviews, residents of Kabwela and New Israel resettlement communities, Solwezi, 2017. The two settlements are located to the north and south of the mining town centre respectively, and are home to villagers who previously resided on what are now Kalumbila Mine premises. As at Kansanshi mine, FQM constructed a small clinic and school for each resettlement community, as well as providing housing for residents.

Since their establishment however, these communities have been adversely affected by the continued extension of mining facilities. For example, the extension of the Kansanshi mine boundary towards Kabwela community to facilitate the construction of a road and an additional waste dump facility added to the pre-existing displacement and increased the distance that Kabwela residents need to travel to access goods and services in Solwezi town.14 Kesselring, ‘At an Extractive Pace’, pp. 237–44. Kabwela residents complained about the insecurity resulting from FQM’s boundary expansion to facilitate a new tailings dam, because it occupied part of the land on which Kabwela residents had settled. This created fear within the community that future expansion would push them even further into the outskirts of Solwezi.15 Interviews, residents of Kabwela Resettlement Community, Solwezi, 2017. The community’s concerns are valid, given the fast pace at which mining activities are expanding in the region. For example, between 2011 and 2018, the boundary around Kansanshi mine was significantly altered.16 For specific maps, see J. Van Alstine, F. Ngosa, J. Manyindo, et al., ‘Seeking Benefits and Avoiding Conflicts: A Community-Company Assessment of Copper Mining in Solwezi, Zambia’, Report, University of Leeds and London School of Economics, 2011, p. 10; Kesselring, ‘At an Extractive Pace’, p. 240. Specifically, the eastern boundary has been extended further eastwards owing to the establishment of an additional waste facility in 2017.17 Consultation meeting concerning the extension of mining facilities at Kansanshi, August 2017.

On the ‘new’ Copperbelt, other complaints about resettlement sites focus on the long distances to town centres and limited access to goods and services. Except for Kabwela and the Northern Settlement that are situated closer to Solwezi and Kalumbila town centres respectively, the other resettlement communities are located far from health, education and social services. Many residents feel that their previous homes were better located and serviced than these resettlement sites. This example suggests that on the ‘new’ Copperbelt relocation has created nostalgia for former homes rather than abated feelings of loss and dislocation as suggested by Askland. Mususa refers to a nostalgic memory of the past on the ‘old’ Copperbelt in the aftermath of privatisation, through which people exaggerate the positive nature of the past.18 Mususa, ‘There Used to Be Order’, pp. 8, 14–15, 30. In relation to capital and labour relations on the ‘old’ Copperbelt, Larmer describes memories as being ‘at odds with historical reality’ and representing ‘a stable and prosperous “Copperbelt” that never existed.’19 Larmer, ‘Permanent Precarity’, pp. 170–72. This is certainly applicable to local representations of socio-economic prosperity of former customary settlements on the ‘new’ Copperbelt. Despite the undeniable impact of large-scale investment on socio-economic organisation, locals tend to present an exaggerated picture of the positive nature of their lives prior to resettlement.

Nostalgia may also be used by locals to make claims on the company. For example, residents in Kalumbila expressed concerns about FQM’s lack of respect for their culture in relation to the inadequate housing and agricultural provisions offered to them in resettlement locations. The supposed inadequacies of FQM are often presented in comparison to their former homes, where things were done differently. For example, locals complained about the two-bedroomed houses provided for large families in the Kalumbila resettlement sites without consideration for the presence of adult children of both sexes, for whom sharing sleeping quarters is considered culturally inappropriate. They compared this to their ‘more appropriate’ setup in their former homes, where additional sleeping, leisure and cooking quarters were constructed around the main home to ensure privacy and cultural appropriateness.20 Interviews, residents of Northern Settlement, Kalumbila, October 2017. Although the two-bedroomed houses do indeed tend to be overcrowded for larger families, similar housing was historically provided for African mineworkers on the ‘old’ Copperbelt. ‘Family housing’ was only introduced after 1940, following outcries from mineworkers over what they considered to be inadequate housing conditions.21 Home, ‘From Barrack Compounds to the Single-Family House’, p. 328. The disparities between local and mining company approaches to housing do, however, highlight the challenges in creating an effective and mutually beneficial relationship between companies and indigenous mining communities.

Regarding the limited access to agricultural land, FQM is currently legalising farm plots for residents of resettlement sites, following complaints over the lack of farmland and subsequent encroachment by locals on vacant land that is within FQM’s licensed area. Given that some resettled residents were able to continue farming on previously owned land at the time of resettlement, FQM introduced conservation farming. The project adapts traditional farming methods in order to increase the yield from a given plot of land, encouraging sustainable land use and promoting food security.22 Interview, Anonymised, Kalumbila, 18 October 2017. The company planned to provide the initial financing for the project, and then gradually withdraw its support so that it would be self-sustaining in the long term.23 Ibid. However, many community members felt ‘abandoned’ by the mining company when its support was eventually withdrawn.24 Interview, Senior Group Leader Northern Settlement, Kalumbila, 15 October 2017; Interview, Senior Group Leader, Shinengene, Kalumbila, 20 October 2017. This has again created nostalgia among resettled communities for their former homes, which supposedly facilitated farming activities.

According to the Kalumbila Trident Foundation CSR Manager, Garth Lappeman, one of the greatest challenges in relocating mining communities is that Zambian legislation lacks clear-cut guidelines for such processes.25 Interview, Mr Lappeman, Kalumbila, 18 October 2017. Therefore, mining companies employ the guidelines provided by the Ministry of Agriculture for crop-related compensation, compensating for relocation from their cultivated land. Drafting a relocation plan is a strenuous process, in which various drafts go back and forth between the company, non-governmental organisations and national government for approval. Although the process supposedly requires the involvement of community members, respondents reported that they were not directly consulted. Negotiations with the mining company are often conducted exclusively by the most senior customary authorities, who do not always represent local grievances effectively.26 Interviews, residents of Kalumbila, 2017–18. A further complexity arises from the variations in land and agricultural value, which means that relocated families do not receive equal compensation. This raises suspicions among locals about their neighbours’ ability to negotiate for better packages and whether these are influenced by possible ‘connections’ to influential people within the mines or government.27 Interviews, residents of Northern and Southern Settlements, Kalumbila, October 2017.

This chapter highlights variations in mining communities within the two regions and how they have affected the extent and severity of environmental consequences. In this vein, the chapter argues that despite pollution being a significant challenge in both regions, pollution on the ‘new’ Copperbelt appears to be less severe owing to the recent nature of mining activities and the consequent limited environmental evidence of pollution. This contrasts to the ‘old’ Copperbelt, where commercial mining has been undertaken almost continuously since the 1920s. Using the example of the ‘old’ Copperbelt as a blueprint for the development of environmental concerns, the chapter concludes that, despite the limited evidence of severe pollution on the ‘new’ Copperbelt, the region is likely to follow in the footsteps of its predecessor if mining communities are not protected. In addition to the existing environmental concerns, the impact of mining on communities on the ‘new’ Copperbelt is likely to be further shaped by the complexity of state-mining company-community relationships that have emerged in what remains an ‘indigenous’ society. This is because evidence concerning relations between the three parties suggests differences in approach and understanding of what constitutes effective environmental management for communities adjacent to and affected by mining.