Chapter 5 The Political Economy of West African Integration: The Transport Sector on Two Port Corridors

Given an over-supply of small independent truckers who operate on relatively thin margins, ‘the poverty and social impact of trucking reform will be considerable’.2 World Bank, Program Information Document, Concept Stage. Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness DPO, IV Poverty and Social Impacts and Environment Aspects, Washington, D.C., 2014. While this may be the case on paper, given the political sensitivities of such reforms, it is important to understand where the main barriers and opportunities for transport reform lie, domestically and in regional terms.

Recent analysis and anecdotal evidence also suggest that user charges in West African ports are above average, and may be inflated. This is despite the rise in ‘landlord ports’ whose container terminal operations have been concessioned to private sector operators, ostensibly to boost efficiency and bring down costs for users. These high costs are surprising given the proximity of at least six ports along the coast between Benin and Côte d’Ivoire.

While there is arguably ‘a good case for more co-operation between West African countries on port reform, competition and regulation’, the challenge is to see where the interests for this might lie in reality – who currently collects what rents in the current system; what is the distribution of gains within and between countries; and who would incur losses from modernising the sector?3 World Bank, Western Africa. Making the Most of Ports in West Africa, Report No: ACS17308, Washington, D.C., 2016.

This chapter aims to respond to these questions for the ports and road transport markets in West Africa. It focuses on the corridors connecting Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso to Lomé in Togo, and to Tema in Ghana.

The analysis suggests that the interests of the hinterland population and private sector in accessing cheaper goods and inputs through lower transport costs are placed below the goal of ensuring Burkina trucks carry Burkina-bound goods, with costs to overall efficiency and to the detriment of efficiency-seeking reforms.

While corridors vary in length, road quality, and the choice between road and rail, ports also vary in depth – this determines the size of ships that can dock, with larger ships offering the potential to offload more goods in one visit. Lomé is regularly cited as the deepest natural port in the region at 15 metres, with Tema and others in the region requiring regular dredging. At the same time, an in-depth study by JICA finds that though the route with the longest section in a poor state to Ouagadougou, the Lomé Corridor has the least roadblocks and is the least expensive in the region – this has also made it the most frequented in terms of traffic volume.1 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Projet du Plan Directeur de l’Aménagement des Réseaux Logistiques pour l’Anneau de Croissance en Afrique de l’Ouest, Rapport d’Avancement, Tokyo, 2016.

These all potentially affect the cost equation for transporters and therefore for shippers from hinterland countries like Burkina Faso. In principle, the country that manages to best align public and private sector actors around its port and facilitating trade should be able to reap benefits along with hinterland transporters and shippers.

But these physical aspects are only some of the factors that determine which goods travel along which corridor. Tufour cites the following: direct transit cost, transit time and the reliability of the corridor, safety and security, as well as language difficulties or incompatibility between stakeholders in given countries as equally important factors that determine corridor choices.2 Augustine Kwabena Tufour, ‘Critical Factors that Influence the Attractiveness of Ghana’s Corridor to Stake-Holders Engaged in the Transit Business of Landlocked Burkina Faso’, Africa Development and Resources Research Institute Journal, 25:3, 2015, pp. 69–82. For instance, at different times, the Côte d’Ivoire civil wars in the first decade of the 2000s, strict Ghanaian axle load limit enforcement, Togo road damage and Benin customs procedures all affected traffic volumes on the different corridors, thus affecting the corridor choice of shippers.3 World Bank, Western Africa.

Port and terminal strategies also shape trade flows and shipper decisions. Security is particularly important with there being a pressing need to find alternative routes when tensions in coastal countries affect transit, as in Côte d’Ivoire from 2002 to 2011 or Togo from the mid-1990s until 2006. Thus, the choice of corridors for Burkina Faso and other hinterland countries ostensibly promotes competition but also provides alternative routes when instability erupts.

Beyond interests in maintaining national ports, only a small number of private companies dominate the sub-region’s ports. Bolloré Africa Logistics is a major player with significant presence in all major ports. They operate terminals in joint ventures with APM Terminals in Abidjan and Tema, while the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) operates terminals in Lomé. Debrie points to the network strategy used by companies around key ports and corridors with port concessions.5 Debrie, ‘West African Port System’, no page. According to one view, Bolloré expects to lose money on serving the remote ends of its ‘vital corridors’, but believes maintaining the network will put it in a better position to bid for supplying lucrative mining projects.6 Economist, Network Effects: Connectivity and Commitment Pay Dividends in African Transport, 16 October 2008 <www.economist.com/node/12432456> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. World Bank describes a ‘region-wide quasi duopoly of two dominant TOCs (terminal operating companies, namely Bolloré and APM Terminals), which compete or co-operate in different ports and together control around 80 per cent of container throughput’.7 World Bank, Western Africa.

While diversification across ports can be seen as a legitimate strategy for private operators in view of past instability, the market structure for port terminals limits competition. As such, even with concessioning and growing trade volumes, ‘prices for end users have not gone down and have increased significantly in some cases, generating substantial profits for ToCs’.8 World Bank, Western Africa. The same report also highlights that ‘shippers have far less service options and far less bargaining power, and therefore face greater risks [than shipping lines, the other port user]’. Combined with the understandable lack of willingness of countries to rely on a port in a single neighbouring country, there is a ‘continuation of multiple, sub-optimal size facilities which are naturally monopolistic and suggest the need for economic regulation’. Recent scrutiny of terminal concession processes both in the countries analysed here and elsewhere suggest that Bolloré is particularly seen as wielding political power both through its importance as a French overseas interest, and its role in supporting political campaigns (further discussed below). This suggests that shippers’ interests have limited influence on vested interests, with political considerations trumping efficiency concerns.

But more than the economic challenge this poses, these imbalances have political repercussions. Burkina Faso’s reliance on access to inputs and consumer goods in particular, and the threat of instability in neighbouring countries, creates political pressure to minimise reliance on the trucking industries of other countries. This amplifies the political importance of the Burkinabè trucking industry, its transport unions, organisations such as the Conseil Burkinabè des Chargeurs (Burkina Shippers Council, CBC), and their relations to the coastal country transport actors.11 The Burkina Transport Minister is also responsible for Infrastructure and ‘Disenclavement’. The importance attributed to transport is also reflected in government strategies that refer to the importance of regional infrastructures and transport to support planned growth poles and the priority sectors of agriculture, mines, crafts and SMEs and ‘promotion of economic integration and Foreign Trade’. It is also seen through the priority given by the government to renewing the truck transport fleet, with a recently adopted decree to allow duty-free and VAT-free importation of 900 vehicles over a period of two years from May 2016, the fourth such exercise since 1985.12 R. F. Dandjinou, ‘Burkina Faso: Conseil des Ministres – Importation de 900 Véhicules de Transport Exonérés de Droits de Douanes et de Tva’, AllAfrica [online], 26 May 2016. <https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201605261191.html> [Accessed 27 April 2021].

This is similar for Togo, where the economic weight of the port is large in a small economy. That differs from Ghana (or Côte d’Ivoire), where domestic markets are much larger, reducing the relative importance of transit traffic.13 G. Raballand, et al., Why Does Cargo Spend Weeks in Sub-Saharan African Ports? Lessons from Six Countries. Directions in Development—Trade, Washington, D.C., 2012; they then associate this with Lomé offering exceptionally long free time for traffic in transit. In 2013 transport services as a share of commercial service exports represented 53.1 per cent for Togo, compared to 29.6 for Ghana and 17.6 for Côte d’Ivoire.14 World Development Indicators, last updated 5 February 2016

The seasonality in trade also adds to the economic and political challenges. While there can be transport shortages at certain times of year such as harvest time for export crops, and Ramadan when imports of basic goods such as rice and sugar to hinterland countries go up, imbalances reportedly also lead to an oversupply of trucks at quiet times of year. This puts pressure on the unions operating at the ports and on transport contractors in terms of distributing the little freight there is.15 When doing interviews for this study with the Togo transport union, only five containers were available for transporting, compared to a list of more than 100 trucks waiting for freight.

At a formal level, Togo and Burkina Faso are members of eight-member West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), while all three plus Ghana are part of the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which includes all UEMOA members. The two francophone states are also part of a loose network of ‘like-minded’ nations under the Conseil d’Entente, again not including Ghana.17 The Conseil de l’Entente (Council of Accord or Council of Understanding) is a West African regional co-operation forum. It was established in May 1959 by Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Dahomey (now Benin), and joined in 1966 by Togo, having grown out of the short-lived Sahel–Benin Union, a successor to the dissolved French regional colonial federation of French West Africa. Since 1966 the Council has possessed a permanent administrative secretariat based in Abidjan. A mutual aid and loan guarantee fund exists to assist poorer members from a common pool <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conseil_de_l%27Entente>. While ostensibly this creates some hurdles for transit through Ghana given its distinct currency, administrative language and regulatory processes, Ghana is nonetheless an observer of UEMOA and indeed was one of the first to implement the UEMOA axle load limit, a key issue affecting costs between corridors today.18 While UEMOA countries adopted regulation (règlement) 14 on axle load and harmonisation of standards and procedures across countries, this has not been fully enforced, with no systematic sanctions for noncompliance. Paying bribes in Cedi is also reportedly cheaper than the CFA Franc bribes expected along the other corridors.

Given that ‘the CBC has the responsibility of ensuring that this rule is enforced’ through agents in each port, this puts considerable power in the hands of the CBC to determine freight allocation across transporters, even if rules are not always applied.19 Teravaninthorn and Raballand, Transport Prices and Costs. Importantly, the quota applies to shipments on a case-by-case basis, not to the average overall volume of goods or number of containers over a day or week. This means that for each consignment of three containers, two must be carried by Burkinabè transporters, or negotiated over with the CBC. Where formal agreements do exist, cabotage is not allowed, meaning that no foreign truckers can be involved in the transport of domestic cargo.

The origins and validity of these agreements across the corridor countries are not clear. Terevaninthorn and Raballand state that the ‘bilateral treaties are in place because after a crisis that followed the 1992 transport deregulation, the government of Burkina Faso signed an agreement with all its corridor partners (Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo and Benin) to establish quotas’.20 Teravaninthorn and Raballand, Transport Prices and Costs. But while other studies refer to a 1984 bilateral agreement between Haute Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Togo to limit haulage of transit freight imported to Burkina Faso through Lomé to Togolese and Burkinabè trucks in the ratio one-third, two-thirds respectively, more recent information suggests that Ghana has in fact no such formal agreement.21 Protocole d’Accord de Transports Routiers entre la République Togolaise et la République de Haute-Volta, Lomé, 14 April 1984; West Africa Trade Hub (WATH), Transport and Logistics Costs on the Lomé-Ouagadougou Corridor, Report #47, no place of publication, 2012, also cites Burkina Faso ministerial decree number 82–0358/CMRPN/PRES/MTP.T.URB.

Though the Burkinabé would like such an arrangement with Ghana, Ghanaian truckers are reluctant to acquiesce. According to Luguje, Ghana’s ports handled no (from the late 1980s to early 1990s), or only negligible amounts of transit freight (until the second half of the 1990s).22 Luguje, 2004. Perhaps for this reason, freight sharing along that corridor was never fully formalised. Nonetheless, in July 2015 Burkinabè concerns about loss of access to their own transit freight led to the border being closed and renewed pressure on Ghana to accept an agreement stipulating that Burkinabé truckers carry two-thirds of shipments and coastal country truckers one-third.23 For example, see Les Echos du Faso, ‘Altercation entre Chauffeurs Burkinabè et Ghanéens des Problèmes de Chargements Évoqués’ 30 July 2015 on recent tensions between Ghanaian and Burkinabe drivers over freight sharing <http://lesechosdufaso.net/altercation-entre-chauffeurs-burkinabe-et-ghaneens-des-problemes-de-chargements-evoques/> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. Interviews in the field suggest that little has changed since Teravaninthorn and Raballand’s report of 2009: ‘The unofficial rules in a port in West Africa are as follows: A shipper informs the CBC it has a shipment to be transported to Burkina Faso. The CBC then informs the OTRAF, the Burkinabè truckers union, about this shipment and all its details. It may or may not negotiate the tariff with the shipper. OTRAF turns to its constituents and assigns the load on a first come–first served basis. This tour de rôle is updated in real time: when a truck arrives in the port, the driver goes to the OTRAF representative to be added to the waiting list. Once the contract is established, the trucker pays its due to the association (FCFA 10,000) for the service it provided and to the CBC (FCFA10,200) for the loading authorisation.’ The only difference, discussed by corridor, relates to the first-come-first-served basis, which is also reportedly subject to flexible, informal arrangements.

Whether formal or informal, the system in place gives the CBC monopoly power in the way freight is distributed. According to interviews this is to secure Burkinabè access to necessary imports, but also to address concerns about employment and the ‘social dimension of the sector’ leading them to protect their transport sector. This then promotes close linkages between CBC and OTRAF (Organisation des Transporteurs du Faso), representing a key aspect of the way the sector is governed. In effective terms, the sector is organised so as to protect Burkinabè truckers at the expense of the wider population. This is a fundamental reality that must be taken account of in any attempts to encourage trade facilitation and transport sector reform.

Additional ‘informal’ or unwritten rules also shape the transport sector and the political weight given to strengthening regional connections. These relate to the way that ‘formal’ rules and agreements are applied – axle load limits have been a ‘rule’ since the 1980s but not fully applied, leaving application open to abuse and by those monitoring transport along the corridors. The freight-sharing quota agreements are also reportedly only applied at certain times, when tensions mount or when volumes are highest, and open to negotiation between shipper and OTRAF.

Overall, a range of different foundational and institutional factors underlie regional relations, all affecting the way in which the transport sector is organised within each of the affected countries. While there is the potential for competition between corridors, this is dampened by the structure of the ports market and relations between transport operators between countries. The broad structural and institutional factors felt at the regional level then affect the political weight of the transport sector across countries, with implications for the political power of different actors within the countries.

The vast majority of Lomé’s transit traffic is destined for Ouagadougou.2 JICA, Projet du Plan. This raises the importance of Togo–Burkina relations at a political level, but also between actors in the freight chain. Further, the government growth strategy highlights the role of the port authority given that ‘90 per cent of Togo’s foreign trade passes through the PAL [Port Autonome de Lomé]’.3 IMF, Country Reports 14/224, Togo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 76, Washington, D.C., 2013.

There is also considerable unrecorded trade to countries in the region. It is among the largest ‘under-invoicers of export proceeds’, with illicit outflows from Togo reportedly averaging 66 per cent of GDP between 2002 and 2011 – peaking at 140 per cent of GDP in 2008, more than four times the annual budget.4 Dirk Kohnert, ‘Togo Country Report’, in D. Kar and J. Spanjers (eds), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2003–2012, New York, 2014. Informal trade with Nigeria in cars, fuel, rice and fabrics is substantial. Though on a smaller scale compared to Benin, this shapes political dynamics around the port.

The Lomé port falls under the authority of the PAL, which handles clinker, wheat and hydrocarbons, while container traffic comes through two terminal concessions. One of these was awarded to Bolloré Africa Logistics under a 35-year concession that was awarded in 2010; and another to a joint venture between MSC and China Merchant Holding International (CMHI) also under a 35-year concession since October 2014, with options for ten more years to operate the brand-new Lome Container Terminal (LCT), reportedly representing the largest private sector investment in Togo. Though the ‘concessions have provided Governments with millions of dollars in revenue through entry tickets, annual fees and royalty payments on traffic handled by concessionaires’ the exact level of financial contributions of the port to government coffers is hard to gauge.5 Christopher Clott and Bruce C. Hartman, ‘Supply chain integration, landside operations and port accessibility in metropolitan Chicago’, Journal of Transport Geography 51 (2016), 130–39.

The concession process has not been without controversy. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the awarding of concession contracts has been used as an instrument to help the incumbent regime, also supported by business networks operating in France and Togo. At the same time, Bolloré’s interest in the port of Lomé is seen by some as a defence of its interests elsewhere in the region, with articles citing internal communication at Bolloré concerned about how investment in Lomé might undermine their investments elsewhere, most notably in Abidjan.6 R. Lecadre, ‘Bolloré et Dupuydauby, Deux Requins dans les Ports Africains’, Libération, 3 June 2009. News reports cite opposition party members complaining about the insignificant ‘crumbs’ that the port contributes to the budget.7 K. Mensah, ‘Togo, un Pays en Faillite qui Enfante des Milliardaires, TOGO-online, 16 February 2016 <https://togo-online.net/togo/togo-un-pays-en-faillite-qui-enfante-des-milliardaires/> [Accessed 27 April 2021].

MSC’s entry into Lomé is seen as ‘an entry point into a closed market’ that may alter port dynamics and indeed the role of Togo in the region.8 Hartman 2016; Olivier Caslin and Andrew Lynch, ‘À Lomé, MSC inaugure un nouveau concept’, Jeuneafrique, 23 December 2015 <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/287892/economie/andrew-lynch-a-lome-msc-inaugure-nouveau-concept/> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. LCT, aiming for a capacity of 1.5 million TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units) in the long run, is intended as a hub port for MSC.9 Kohnert, ‘Togo Country Report’. Its move into Lomé in 2014 followed a previous investment in San Pedro, Côte d’Ivoire in 2008, but which was disrupted by Côte d’Ivoire’s subsequent instability, again highlighting the role of peace and security in determining port investment choices. Lomé is intended principally as a hub port for transhipment services linking to nine ports in the region, serving its Africa Express service arriving from key Asian ports via Durban and Cape Town, and potentially helping to lower prices. The intention is thereby to offer a hub and spoke service to deep-sea West Africa liner services.10 The ports are: Abidjan, Cotonou, Douala, Freetown, Lagos (Tin Can), Libreville, Monrovia, Takoradi and Tema; PortStrategy, From Famine to Feast, 10 February 2015 <www.portstrategy.com/news101/world/africa/w-africa-article#sthash.P2mWxFBV.dpuf> [Accessed 27 April 2021].

The MSC-run terminal being deeper (16.6 metres) than Bolloré’s (12–15 metres), larger ships can dock.11 JICA, Projet du Plan. Moreover, future price cuts may favour greater containerisation, for example for mining and forestry products.12 JICA, Projet du Plan. Anecdotally, high-level political discussion and external pressure also led MSC to promise to focus on transhipment, not gateway traffic, which was to be left to their competitors. While this may be the case, the MSC decision to invest was also shaped by interest in Lomé as a gateway port connecting to the regional rail ring foreseen for the region.13 Caslin and Lynch, ‘À Lomé, MSC Inaugure un Nouveau Concept’. Since 2014, the volume of its container traffic has tripled.14 Abel Bove, et al., ‘West and Central Africa Trucking Competitiveness’, SSATP Working Paper No. 108, Washington, D.C., 2018.

Beyond private sector interests, President Faure Gnassingbe has reportedly also put forward his country as the ‘West African staging point for China’s Silk Road initiative, as countries on the continent begin to warm up to the Asian giant’s plan to be a major geopolitical player’.15 President Faure Gnassingbe in interview with Chinese state news agency Xinhua <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016–05/28/c_135394923.htm>. Transformation of the transport and logistics sector into a modern industry has become a first strategic priority in its National Development Plan 2018–2022.16 Bove, et al., Trucking Competitiveness. The entry of MSC into Lomé port and their direct line from East Asia appear to at least partially confirm this.

Again reflecting the broader reliance on transport in Togo, the PAL has a strategy targeting transit traffic with Lomé as a gateway port: while domestic goods can remain for free in port for only four days, Raballand et al. say that this rises to 21 days for transit goods – ‘the Port Authority of Lomé seems reluctant to use pricing to lower dwell time for fear of losing competitive advantage over other ports’.17 Raballand, et al., Why Does Cargo?

However, transporters and the port authority complain of a wide range of costs and charges that they say lowers the competitivity of the Lomé Corridor. In particular, UEMOA regulation 14 is seen as a key challenge for the sector. Reportedly (according to interviews) due to its recent heavy investments in road infrastructure, the Togolese government began to strictly impose the UEMOA axle load limit as of January 2016, seen by some interviewees as having undermined Lomé and its transporters’ competitiveness. As the West African Trade Hub (WATH) state: ‘Trucking prices are basically a function of load—the more tonnes carried the lower the cost per tonne—and whether the cargo is containerised or not.’18 WATH, Transport and Logistics Costs on the Lomé-Ouagadougou Corridor. While 1 June 2016 was agreed on as the date to implement regulation 14 across the region, it is not yet clear what has happened in this regard.

Another frequently raised concern of transporters and the PAL is the so-called Bordereau Electronique de Suivi de Cargaison (BESC) or electronic shipment form. Formally speaking, the BESC is meant to provide statistics, identification of merchandise, transport cost control and traceability of goods.19 See more at <www.lexportateur.com/faq.asp?id_page=205#sthash.ILf8pNDy.dpuf>/.

Various elements have led to controversy around this shipping requirement that is reportedly not required along the other corridors. While initially managed by the Togo Shippers Council (the Conseil National de Chargeurs Togolais, CNCT), under President Gnassingbé’s brother, ‘opacity’ around how it was being managed led the government to put its management out to tender, won by a Belgian company and leading to a four-fold cost increase to CFA70,000 per container.20 Conseil National des Chargeurs du Togo, ‘Trafic General’, 2016 <https://cnct.tg/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Trafic-General-2016.pdf>. In addition, Burkinabe importers reportedly already pay the BESC for tracking by the CBC, leading to double-payment of this charge for which there is little understanding of the benefits.21 Interviewees, various.

Other issues raising costs along the Lomé Corridor relate to: deposits for containers that remain high, encouraging destuffing and axle overloading; customs scanning, where goods periodically appear as ‘unreadable’ due to specific packaging materials, opening the way for perfectly ‘readable’ goods being classified as unreadable and container stripping, opening up opportunities for corruption; a droit de passage (DDP) imposed by the Chambre du Commerce du Burkina Faso (CCBF) to finance the bonded warehouse it operates; charges to use rest areas by truckers (around US$20 for a night); GPS tracking to avoid transit goods going missing en route to Ouagadougou where fines are imposed due to batteries running down either due to not being charged, or because of unexpected delays caused by technical faults etc.22 WATH, Transport and Logistics Costs on the Lomé-Ouagadougou Corridor. Drivers also report theft of these transmitters, which is suspected as being done in collaboration with Cotecna staff.23 Interview, Lomé, May 2016.

To add to this, trucks reportedly do too few trips to allow profitability – the OTRAF president is quoted as saying that ‘while in developed countries the truck does 30,000–50,000 kilometres per month, Burkinabe trucks do a maximum of 20,000 kilometres per year’.24 ‘Crise à l’OTRAF: Les Chauffeurs Transporteurs Interpellant le Premier Ministre Yacouba Isaac Zida’ aOuaga.com, 31 July 2015 <http://news.aouaga.com/h/73076.html> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. While these average figures for developed countries may be exaggerated, the main point made by Yssouf Maïga, President of OTRAF, remains valid. Transporters therefore complain of the underlying low profitability of trucking despite the high prices they charge.

A recent JICA report estimates that between 60 and 80 per cent of freight is transported as break-bulk, rather than in containers.25 JICA, Projet du Plan. The WATH also cites similar figures, estimating that 60–70 per cent of transit containers are stripped (unloaded) and the goods trucked to landlocked countries as break bulk, while 30–40 per cent of transit containers continue to Ouagadougou, 20 per cent of them under a ‘through bill of lading’.26 WATH, Transport and Logistics Costs on the Lomé-Ouagadougou Corridor. The through bill of lading implies that the shipper pays for door-to-door delivery with a transport company, encouraging the use of containers and thus reducing axle overloading. However, the through bill of lading does not guarantee that the contracted company will carry the goods, as described below, with all goods essentially subject to rules on access to freight, managed by the CBC and the transport union OTRAF.

In essence, while CBC is informed of all information regarding transit traffic, this is then passed on to OTRAF for distribution among carriers. OTRAF themselves see their role as protecting the two-thirds vs one-third quota, as reflected in interviews and their report from the first quarter of 2015, for example.27 ‘Transport Routier: L’OTRAF Appelle Ses Membres au Respect Scrupuleux de la Charge à l’Essieu’, LeFaso, 12 August 2015 <http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article66328> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. That means that OTRAF is essentially the gatekeeper to transit traffic, imposing the two-thirds one-third rule on freight that arrives without a predetermined carrier (the through bill of lading), leaving UNATROT (L’Union Nationale des Transporteurs Routiers du Togo, the Togo union) to allocate freight to its truckers on a first-come-first-served basis: the infamous tour de rôle.

Perhaps more interestingly, even when freight arrives with a through bill of lading, implying that the shipper has already taken out a contract with a transporter to ensure door-to-door delivery of goods, this shipment is nonetheless subject to the quota. Take for example a shipment of nine containers bound for Ouagadougou with a through bill of lading. Six of the nine containers are the responsibility of a logistics company, with a contract with one transport company, and are subject OTRAF demands. For the remaining three containers, the same companies may be able to carry one or two, depending on negotiations with UNATROT.28 Interview, Lomé, May 2016.

Further, the driver chosen for a load pays a fee to the transporters’ associations from both countries for the allocation service and assistance when travelling along the corridor, and also to drivers’ unions from both countries, the OTRAF and the UNATROT. This is defended as being for assistance during the trip.29 WATH, Transport and Logistics Costs on the Lomé-Ouagadougou Corridor.

This system then implies that a contracted transporter must fully carry the risk of using the transporter allocated by OTRAF or UNATROT. In cases where unionised individual truckers have not enough insurance to cover the merchandise being carried, it is known for contract transport companies to take out additional insurance, charge this to OTRAF or UNATROT, in order for the transport to take place. Companies have been known to refuse trucks deemed not to be in good enough condition, but this then also risks hold-up from OTRAF or UNATROT who essentially wield power in the ports by blocking entry or exit of specific goods or trucks. At the same time, contracted companies can be held responsible for poorly maintained trucks imposed by the unions that then break down on their way to Ouagadougou, implying substantial additional costs and losses than then must be negotiated with the union in question.

This means that, in practice, the quota, freight distribution system and goods with through bill of lading are subject to negotiation between transporters, OTRAF and UNATROT. Freight distribution also depends on the availability of trucks, and the levels of freight passing through the port. It can happen that a contracted transport company manages to carry its full consignment (e.g. of nine containers), but this would mean that in a future consignment it might be obliged by OTRAF and/or UNATROT to forego freight to ‘pay back’ for what it was allowed to take.30 Interviewee.

While little of this is formally stated or established, in spite of the formal bilateral agreement around the quota, what emerges is that regardless of the contracts established, UNATROT and OTRAF manage to hold transporters to ransom in order to gain access to freight. While in interviews the unions defend their practices as defending the access to freight of single-truck, driver-owner transporters, and thus what one might call inclusivity, critics from within the transport sector also point to preferential treatment within the unions – more powerful or influential members of UNATROT can pay to be put at the front of the queue. Similarly, interviewees suggest that import agents are known to take the fee for importing goods but then selling the access to these goods to the highest bidder (who may then also sell this on to another person) introducing additional transaction costs and lowering the price ultimately received by the transporter.

While Burkina Faso has been going through important political changes, with President Compaoré driven from office by popular protests in December 2014, demands for political change also carried over to OTRAF. Protesting truckers forced the previous OTRAF head to resign in December 2014 after being in position for 19 years, amid accusations of nepotism, tariffs charged and preferential distribution of freight to the OTRAF president’s family and close acquaintances.31 ‘Les manifestants ont pris d’assaut les bureaux de l’organisation qu’ils ont presque mis à sac. Ils reprochent au président Sankara d’occuper son poste depuis 19 ans et d’avoir placé des membres de sa famille et connaissances aux postes influents. Les chauffeurs se plaignent aussi des tarifs appliqués sur les voyages. Boukaré Sankara et ses proches, selon toujours les manifestants, se partageraient les bons de transport, occasionnant un manque de travail et de revenus réguliers pour le reste des transporteurs’; Stella Nana, ‘Ouaga: Les chauffeurs et transporteurs exigent et obtiennent le départ du président de l’OTRAF’, Burkina24, 1 December 2014 <www.burkina24.com/2014/12/01/ouaga-les-chauffeurs-et-transporteurs-exigent-et-obtiennent-le-depart-du-president-de-lotraf-2/> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. News articles from July 2015 continued to refer to the issue of OTRAF distributing freight in Lomé and Tema according to payments made by their truckers to the detriment of Burkinabe truckers, reflecting the internal incentives at OTRAF to maximise payments rather than necessarily ensuring freight distribution to their members, leading Burkinabe truckers to close the frontier in 2015.

According to Gueh-Akué, the environment for unions, or syndicats, in Togo is characterised by fragmentation, ‘permanent social tension’, use of strikes as the only collective negotiation tool and a deficit of other alternatives.32 N. Goeh-Akue, ‘Etude sur Le Paysage Syndical au Togo’, 2015 <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/benin/12374.pdf>. Drivers and transporters therefore use blockages at truck parks and around ports and towns to arbitrarily demand contributions.33 Ibid. While there is an implicit understanding that the unions wield political power to create instability, it may be that recent reforms have reduced previous hostility – one report suggests that though strong in 2012 with unions managing to bring mass protests, unions are far more divided today with certain key figures joining the government ‘regime’ and government quickly managing to point to a minority ‘privileged handful’.34 Olivier Rogez, ‘Togo: le Systéme Faure’, RFI, 4 May 2015 <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20150504-togo-systeme-faure-gnassingbe-eyadema-unir-jean-pierre-fabre-anc-cap-2015-election-> [Accessed 27 April 2021].

The impact of the current system is to limit the amount of freight available among transporters, therefore raising the pressure to carry as much freight as possible in one trip, bringing the discussion back full circle to axle regulation imposition and transport costs. The combination of factors is reportedly shrinking and closing several formal transport companies in Togo.

Current strategies underway to promote formalisation include the formation of co-operatives. However, rather than numerous co-operatives emerging, UNATROT created one co-operative for all of its members, CNATROT (La Coopérative Nationale des Transporteurs Routiers du Togo), formed in February 2016 with the Ministry of Infrastructures and Transport ‘inviting’ transporters to join.35 Hélène Dubidji, ‘Les Transporteurs Routiers en Coopérative pour Faire Face aux Défis du Secteur’, iciLome.com, 18 February 2016 <https://news.icilome.com/?idnews=819221> [Accessed 27 April 2021].

As the above discussion suggests, there are many internal bargaining processes and power games within UNATROT that therefore also seem likely to affect the impact of this initiative.

The Tema–Ouagadougou Corridor is key to growing transit freight volumes, as 80 per cent of transit traffic through Ghana is accounted for by Burkina Faso (see Table 5.2). Transit trade with Niger and Mali has declined in recent years and given the geography of the region, there is little obvious potential for growing the currently marginal volumes of transit trade with these countries.36 JICA, Projet du Plan. It does seem, however, that the focus in Ghana is much more on satisfying the domestic market than on growing transit trade volumes. For example, stakeholders at Tema Port claim that the port – and Ghana in general – does a bad job ‘marketing’ the Tema–Ouagadougou Corridor to shipping lines, and does not make enough effort to attract transit traffic.37 Discussion at Tema Port (CBC, BAL). This is despite the fact that the port offers some advantages over other ports in the region.

In August 2004, the concession for the development and operation of a container terminal was awarded for 20 years to Meridian Port Services (MPS), a partnership between the companies APMT and BAL (35 per cent each) and the GPHA (30 per cent).38 World Bank, Western Africa. The terminal became partly operational in April 2007, with an annual capacity of 0.5 million TEUs, which was expanded in June 2013 to 1 million TEUs. Around 20 per cent of container traffic is handled in multipurpose berths run by GPHA and other local operators.

A recent study noted a number of advantages of Tema Port vis-à-vis its competitors in the region. These include: relatively competitive (official) port tariffs; daily departure of loaded trucks; safety of freight cargo in the port; electronic tracking along Ghanaian corridors; and dedicated infrastructure for handling transit freight.39 JICA, Projet du Plan; It should be noted, however, that while official tariffs at Tema are competitive relative to neighbouring ports, unofficial payments, including to service providers, consolidators, clearing agents and customs officials, add to the cost of moving goods through Tema Port. Security at Tema Port is generally thought to be better than in other ports in the region.40 Discussion – CBC, BAL. Interviewees also noted the relative stability and reliability of the port (including the fact that it is ‘never closed’), the port’s responsiveness to users (a transit shipper committee meets every quarter to address challenges), and the effectiveness of the ‘berthing window’ at the port.41 Interview, Danish Embassy.

Conversely, relatively long clearance times at Tema Port represent a major bottleneck on the Tema–Ouagadougou Corridor.42 JICA, Projet du Plan. One of the main reasons for the long clearance times is the complexity of administrative procedures and the number of agencies involved. There used to be 29 regulatory agencies involved in the clearance chain, but through engagement with stakeholders and the government, GPHA was able to successfully push for the number to be cut down to 14 by December 2015 (with the hope that the full implementation of the single window will improve the situation even further). According to GPHA, the impact of this reduction has been noticeable for port users.43 Interview, GPHA. Other factors contributing to long clearance times at Tema include the inefficiency of customs clearance procedures (which, according to some, is used as a tactic to solicit unofficial payments); the fact that agents clearing cargo at the port are often servicing multiple clients; the fact that the ‘single window’ is not yet fully operational; persistent congestion problems resulting from a lack of storage (something that should be addressed by ongoing and planned investment in the expansion of the port); and the ‘lack of professionalism’ of many shippers, who are often unfamiliar with relevant requirements, leading to delays in clearing freight.44 Interview, Danish Embassy.

The second factor inhibiting the competitiveness of the corridor is the large number of official and unofficial costs involved in moving goods from Tema Port to Burkina Faso. These include a US$200 transit charge levied by the Ghanaian Central Bank on goods transiting Ghana from Burkina Faso, numerous illicit or informal payments demanded by officials at the numerous checkpoints along the corridor and at the border crossing between the two countries and a CFA10,000 payment demanded by informal ‘agents’ at the Paga border to act as intermediaries between the truckers and customs officers (apparently truckers are not allowed to give their documents directly to customs officers). Previously, efforts by advocacy groups such as Borderless Alliance to monitor the checkpoints along the corridor and the demand for informal payments demanded by officials had led to a reduction in the extent of such demands, but more recently this monitoring has been scaled back, and there is anecdotal evidence that demand for such payments has again increased.

According to CBC, the bon de chargement system has been in place at Tema Port since the 2000s, and it is true that tensions over transit freight allocation practices on the Tema–Ouagadougou Corridor – as well as CBC and OTRAF’s role in these practices – have arisen periodically since at least the early 2000s. Nevertheless it appears that transit freight allocation and the use of the bon de chargement became particularly contentious issues during 2015 and 2016, while the system continues in 2020.4 Romuald Ngueyap, ‘Burkina Faso: Le Gouvernement Met de l’Ordre dans la Gestion du Fret en Provenance et à Destination du Pays’, Agence Ecofin [online], 27 February 2020 <www.agenceecofin.com/transports/2702–74283-burkina-faso-le-gouvernement-met-de-l-ordre-dans-la-gestion-du-fret-en-provenance-et-a-destination-du-pays> [Accessed 27 April 2021]. This is possibly due to the fact that prior to that, CBC and Burkinabe customs/border authorities were less concerned with enforcing freight-sharing quotas.5 It was also suggested by officials of the Ghana Shippers Authority that enforcement was tightened up following the signing of a decree to that effect by a minister in the previous Burkinabe government.

This concern for enforcing freight sharing comes from CBC claims of increasingly unhappy Burkinabe truckers due to Ghanaian truckers carrying ‘everything’ to Burkina Faso, while they were having to wait up to a couple of months at Tema Port to be allocated freight.6 A situation CBC describes as ‘unacceptable’ and as prompting a need to take action to ensure fairness for Burkinabe truckers. Interview, CBC and OTRAF, May 2016. This situation reportedly led to Burkinabe truckers ‘attacking’ the OTRAF head office in Ouagadougou.7 Interview, CBC and OTRAF, May 2016. CBC also claims that its role in ‘organising’ transit freight allocation is partly to address the fact that the system at Tema Port lacked transparency and had become ‘corrupted’ by ‘coxeurs’, well-connected middlemen who are able to use their connections to ensure freight landing at Tema Port is allocated to their preferred transporters, much as in the other ports.8 Interview, CBC and OTRAF, May 2016. CBC claims that, in the case of transit freight, such a situation was not, and would never be, acceptable to Burkina Faso.

In practice, the use of bons de chargement to enforce bilateral quotas raises the cost of transporting freight through the Tema–Ouagadougou Corridor, as the prices demanded by the Burkinabe transporters assigned by OTRAF are generally higher than the market rate (i.e. what Ghanaian transporters would charge).9 The reference price that for Burkinabe transporters to transport freight from Tema to Ouagadougou is CFA 40,000 per tonne. In addition, forwarders at Tema complain that Burkinabe drivers are less professional than those provided by the Ghanaian (or Burkinabe) transport companies that the forwarders would prefer to work with, and cause delays due to their dealing with ‘their own people’ at the Ghana–Burkina Faso border.

Some have noted that these issues never arose under the previous government in Burkina Faso (under Blaise Campaoré), which may point towards changes in political economy dynamics in Burkina Faso. Interestingly, Burkina Faso periodically seeks to renew road haulage fleet and, to this end, in May 2016, the Burkinabe government temporarily suspended VAT and import duties on haulage and road transportation vehicles.10 ‘Le Pays’, GIZ. According to CBC, however, the enforcement of the bon de chargement requirements has nothing to do with attempts to promote the trucking industry in Burkina Faso, and is simply about fairness.11 Interview, CBC and OTRAF, May 2016.

Burkinabe interests and concerns about maintaining a strong Burkinabe transport sector shape much of the transport sector dynamics that we see, with concern for transport jobs and maintaining a ‘national transport sector’ apparently overriding considerations for the price to importers and exporters. The Burkina transporters union, OTRAF and the CBC between them shape the use (or not) of the bilateral freight cargo quotas between countries, while the transporter union in Togo governs freight distribution among transporters. The unions in Ghana are seen to be less influential or effective in asserting the interests of Ghanaian truckers with regards transit traffic, also reflecting a more market-based system.

In the ports, Bolloré Africa Logistics and the Maersk Group – through its port subsidiary APM Terminals – apparently carry considerable political influence in the countries in which they operate, despite some competition from MSC as the one other major terminal operator in the region. Beyond these, a lot of influence is held by customs authorities, whether as a distinct revenue-raising body, or as part of an autonomous revenue authority (the OTR in Togo). Nonetheless, the influence and importance of the transport and transit sectors vary in weight across countries. In Ghana, efforts to professionalise the private-operator segment of the trucking industry are hampered by stricter enforcement of axle-load limits, which puts Ghanaian truckers at a competitive disadvantage

The interests of shippers – consumers, producers and traders – are conspicuous by their absence in discussions of regional transport, with only a few cases emerging of coalitions of reform among citizens or firms, though ports appear more aware of the need to respond to shippers’ needs to promote port interests.

One major game changer may be the envisaged rehabilitation of the Abidjan–Ouagadougou Railway Corridor, and the planned investments in the railway belt linking Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin and finally Togo. Yet, such major multi-country investment programmes suffer from a range of institutional dysfunctions and political uncertainties in different belt countries.

While the focus here is on the port and the transport corridors, the study also points to the strong linkages between narrower corridor development reforms and the broader transport sector reforms, part of which are aimed at professionalising the trucking industry and modernising the trucking market over time. Context-specific foundational factors such as being landlocked, and contextual variables such as economic imbalances between countries, insecurity or the influence of dominant private stakeholders shape the institutional and incentive background against which coalitions prioritise sector reforms or problem solving.