The peace of Mayen Jur
The peace of Mayen Jur appears to provide a counter example to stories of unending war. The years of relative peace in Mayen Jur (Warrap State, near Unity State) since 2013 appear to contradict the narrative of the proliferation of conflict by the hakuma. Yet, importantly, the peace of Mayen Jur was also a manifestation of the will of the hakuma. After decades of hostility, the peace was itself an arbitrary act of the god-like hakuma.
If you travel in one of the few vehicles that regularly journeys on the road to the north-west of Wau, you can continue on the straight but deteriorating murram road for about five hours during which you pass occasional settlements and by-pass others that are hidden further from the road’s edge. The landscape is scattered with trees, including many that are large and mature. Along the way, you pass cattle being herded to market and, occasionally, other commercial vehicles carrying people and their goods. After about five hours (if the road is dry), you will reach the Gogrial East County capital, Lietnhom, and the bend in the River Jur. At this point, you are about halfway to Mayen Jur. Along this axis of the road, the river marks the division between the south-western unbroken, sandier, higher land that is covered with scattered trees, and the north-eastern lower, swampier land of the toc. Beyond the river in the toc; there are only dry-season tracks over these muddied plains and no all-season roads. These lower, richer flood plains host dry-season cattle camps. The toc also historically hosted permanent settlements that were on higher islands of dry land dotted through the swamp. This swamp is fed by the River Jur and also the Bilnyang and connected river systems, as well as the Bahr el Ghazal to the north. Mayen Jur (Warrap State) sits in the middle of these swamp lands. Located among a criss-crossing confluence of rivers, settlements are on a grid of higher, drier land. Mayen Jur is known for its abundance of milk, honey and crops as the land is regularly replenished by the flooding waters.
Since the 1980s, Mayen Jur has been a significant node in national political confrontations. Since the 1980s, forces with a rivalrous relationship to the SPLA, such as those of Matip, Puljang and Gadet (see Chapter 11) have been stationed to the north-east of Mayen Jur in Mayom County (Unity State), while areas to the south-west of Mayen Jur in Gogrial have largely had SPLA sympathies. This has militarised and polarised the relationship, and remade Mayen Jur into a frontline in the wars between Southern rebels. Mayen Jur experienced two decades of violent conflict and militarised landscapes.1 Naomi Pendle, ‘Contesting the Militarization of the Places Where They Met: The Landscapes of the Western Nuer and Dinka (South Sudan)’. Journal of Eastern African Studies 11:1 (2017): 64–85. During the 1990s, settlements in Mayen Jur had been abandoned after deadly raids. The post-CPA era had not seen a confident resettling of Mayen Jur and, episodically, nearby settlements were also displaced. Mayen Jur was effectively a barracks for SPLA soldiers and defensive forces such as the titweng (armed cattle guards with extended responsibilities).
The wars across Mayen Jur were made to be unending wars.2 Ibid. Historically, communities had met and intermarried across the Unity-Warrap border. Yet, the killing of women and children in attacks in the 1990s violated previous norms of war and, as more recently in Tonj North, made the wars unending. By the 2000s, people could not imagine peace between the Dinka and Nuer. Most of the Nuer in Mayom County did not attend the Wunlit Peace Meeting, and cross-border courts seemed unfathomable.
Then 2014 brought a new peace. Despite these decades of militarisation, and despite a sense of crisis in South Sudan in the years after December 2013, Mayen Jur started to experience a nascent end to violent conflict and signs of a more long-lasting peace. From the outset of the war in December 2013, the government relied on an alliance with forces from Mayom. These commanders were strategically important because of their proximity to the oilfields and their ability to act as a check against the rapidly emerging opposition. They also had historic grievances with the leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO), Taban Deng and Riek Machar, and so continued this rivalry through an alliance with government.3 See Chapter 11 and Joshua Craze, Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi, ‘A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013–15’, HSBA Working Paper 42 (Small Arms Survey, 2016). Puljang cemented his leadership during this period and became well known for taxing cattle and income in Mayom, and for using raids into southern Unity State to build the herds of his supporters.4 Craze et al., ‘A State of Disunity’.
In this context of the Juba government’s reliance on Puljang’s forces and new political space for peace between Mayom and Gogrial, Puljang took the opportunity to instigate peace between the titweng (armed cattle guard) of Gogrial East (Warrap State) and Mayom (Unity State). For Puljang, peaceful relationships with the titweng carried various benefits. After the successful 2015 raids into southern Unity State, his forces had larger herds for which they needed adequate pasture. The lush grazing lands of the toc around Mayen Jur were an obvious source of grazing that was then almost unused because of the ongoing relationships of conflict – and could be made accessible through peace. Friendship with Gogrial East also offered Puljang increased chances to benefit from cattle trade. Herders from Mayom gained peaceful access to Wau in order to take cattle for sale. Some traders from Mayom did themselves herd cattle as far as Wau. Most instead only brought cattle to cattle markets in the toc or to Lietnhom where they were bought by Dinka traders who took them on to Wau for sale. As Bentiu grew back as a market, those in Gogrial East could travel to Mayom to sell bulls there. They would be taken on by herders from Mayom for sale in Bentiu. The necessity of permits ensured that the trade happened in sight of these government authorities and that it could be taxed.
In 2015, President Kiir re-divided the states in South Sudan and appointed Gum Makuac as the first governor of the new Gogrial State. While Gum was from Gogrial East, his mother had been from Mayom and Gum had maintained close relations with his maternal kin. This further facilitated peace negotiations.5 Interviews with people from Gogrial, in Juba and by telephone, 2019. The new 2016 peace in Mayen Jur could easily be interpreted as a deal in the elite political marketplace. In reward for Puljang’s loyalty, Kiir made peace possible to allow him to benefit from the toc.
Initially, communities were tentative about this arbitrary peace. Despite the leaders’ military might, these figures initially failed to persuade the communities to accept peace, which was only eventually made through the interventions of Nuer prophet Gatdeang of Mayom and Dinka bany e bith Mangong Madut. Mangong Madut’s home is in Mayen Jur. At the time, he also had another home in Warabeyi as did many from Mayen Jur who fled during fighting. While there were free divinities in Gogrial at the time, it was the baany e biith who was seen as the established, peace-making authority figure and an equivalent to the increasingly priestly role of the prophet. When Puljang and Gum’s initial attempts to enact an elite deal failed, they sought support from these divine leaders. Mangong Madut was invited to Mayen Jur. There he slaughtered a bull as a sign of peace. Once the bull was slaughtered and Gatdeang learnt of the sacrifice, he interpreted it as a sign of welcome and he also came to Mayen Jur to start the process of peace-making.
In 2016, people finally gathered to make the peace. Alongside government officials, two further baany e biith from Gogrial East – Akol Deng and Thik Arop Riiny – also joined the meeting. For the prophet and bany e bith, at the heart of the meeting was an attempt to reassert the spiritual significance of war and, therefore, the lack of spiritual impunity for arbitrary violence. This manifested itself in attempts to reshape patterns of violence and attempts to remake times of conflict as a law-governed space.
Firstly, patterns of violence over the previous decades had violated norms of war and enacted god-like claims to power. This had increased the deadly nature of battles in ways that breached previous expectations of restraint during conflict. Raids would often take place at the break of dawn, when light was still limited. These dawn raids in limited light had the strategic benefit of allowing attackers to approach with an element of surprise.6 Observations of chiefs’ meetings, 2012, Lietnhom. However, this surprise provides no opportunity for an equal defence, and the lack of light makes accidental killings very easy. The killing of women had such high spiritual consequences and resulted in demands for endless feuds. Attacking in a way that risked killing women signalled that those attacking could not imagine a time of peace, but instead only an endless feud. Previously, attacks would intentionally not be made at dawn to prevent the accidental killing of women.7 Interviews with paramount chiefs, 2012 and 2014, Kuajok and Addis Ababa. Therefore, the Gogrial-Mayom attacks at dawn conspicuously showed no care to avoid killing even women and children. They also indicated an image of an unending war without peace. Because of these dangers, many of the cattle camps in the toc had long been devoid of women and children. However, these dawn attacks still highlighted the lack of respect for these norms of war.
In 2016, the prophet and bany e bith pushed for this issue to be explicitly addressed at the peace meeting. In so doing they sought to reinstate a lack of impunity for arbitrary killing by the hakuma and the gun. They offered peace despite the spiritual dangers and consequences of the twenty-year war. Their combined spiritual authority made this unlikely healing more imaginable. Yet, their healing also came with the strong demand for such raiding patterns to halt. The troubles of dawn raids dominated discussions.8 Interview with local church leader who attended the peace meeting, 2018.
Secondly, the prophet and bany e bith pushed for the war years to be seen as a time when laws still applied. A significant question that arose in attempts to make peace was the question of wives in inter-ethnic marriages. Those from Gogrial East and Mayom had historically intermarried and there were many Nuer wives living in the Dinka lands, and vice versa. When conflict had erupted in the 1990s, many of these wives fled to their father’s homeland in fear that they might be targeted as part of the inter-ethnic revenge. Many had lived back home with their fathers for years or occasionally even decades. Among both the Dinka and Nuer, when a daughter returns from her marital home to her father’s home on a long-term basis, this would usually indicate the wife has her father’s permission to divorce her husband. For this to be done legally and to not cause conflict, the wife’s father would have to repay the bride-price to the husband and his family. However, when these wives fled across ethnic lines during conflict, the cattle were not returned to their husbands. Therefore, according to Nuer and Dinka customary law, the husbands of these wives still had a legitimate grievance against families across these ethnic lines. These grievances could only be dissolved by returning either the bride wealth or the wives themselves.
The prophet and bany e bith enforced the return of the wives to their husbands and oversaw this throughout 2016 and 2017.9 Interview with sub-chief and member of the Mayenjur peace committee, Mayendjur, July 2018. Many of these women also had children with them. Some of the wives had assumed the war would last indefinitely and had taken another husband in their father’s community. A normal interpretation of the Dinka and Nuer laws would consider the first husband, who had paid the bride-price, to be the legal father of all the children that the wife had borne. In this situation, the prophet and bany e bith took on a role as interpreters and enforcers of the customary law. They assumed this authority and built their power by the ability to make these rulings. This role was not questioned by the governing authorities, who were eager for them to end the violent conflict.
Some of the wives who were returned had been estranged from the husbands for decades. The children were neither the biological children of these legal fathers, nor did they have any relationship with them. Yet, the choice for these wives and children was removed from them and even from their families. This was a violent decision that felt unjust for many. The prophet and bany e bith insisted on them for the sake of the good of the wider community and for peace, so these returns were enforced.
Crucially, the prophets and the baany e biith were enforcing a logic of peace that complied with law and judicial logics. These priests remade the social insignificance of war by making wartime choices still subject to previous laws. They were not an exception or a rupture. It was not that all was fair in war, but war times were still governed by the continuity of the customary law. Therefore, even in times of war, impunity could not be expected.
The peace meeting also insisted on the creation of the wanth tong court. ‘Wanth tong’ literally means the place of fighting, and the court was set up to sit in this place where the communities had historically fought in Mayen Jur. The name of the court both referred to this physical location but also the court’s intention to replace the fighting. The court was both backed by the government and the religious leaders, giving the court the backing of both divine and hakuma powers. The court had the power to try cases of raiding, as well as to grant compensation after killings. It was not a new initiative but re-created a previous border court that dated back to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period.10 Interview with second member of the Mayenjur peace committee, Mayenjur, July 2018, in Dinka., Elders remember that, at the time of the Condominium government, there were laws in the land of Wanth Tong that governed the relationship of the Nuer in Mayom County and the Dinka in Gogrial East County.
From 2016, the new court was headed by Dinka Chief Mapuol Wol. The court’s deputy was Nuer Chief Gil Nyanteer. The court also included commissioners, the Gogrial governor, Puljang, other chiefs and majokwut (leaders of the cattle camp) and women. Plus, Gatdeang (until his death) and Mangong Madut also sat on this court. Most of the cases heard by the court have involved accusations of stolen cattle. Importantly, this court allowed the peaceful redress of grievances and did not force people to seek violent, self-help justice framed in ethnic terms. Relationships between families could be peacefully restored, and a feud was not necessary. For the court to operate, agreements were made to make common the substantive law of the two groups. For example, after elopement the Nuer expected to be paid three cattle but now accepted to be paid just one. After adultery, Dinka were normally paid four cattle as compensation but now accepted to receive only three.11 Interview with sub-chief and member of the Mayenjur peace committee, Mayenjur, July 2018, in Dinka.
The government had wanted to enforced execution by firing squad against anyone who threatened the peace, such as by stealing cattle. Punitive executions are an expression of the government’s power and their assertion of their power to kill with impunity. However, chiefs and religious leaders contested this government assertion that executions were necessary. Part of the fear of summary executions is the scale of deaths it could cause without any legal check on this violence. As one chief explained in June 2018, ‘[m]en will all be finished if this rule is applied’. The government forces could not ignore this unified pressure and agreed to soften their stance. Instead, it was agreed that a perpetrator who broke the peace would be fined six cows and imprisoned in Mayen Jur for three years.
The peace agreement was concluded with the slaughter and cutting in half of bulls. The feuding parties walked between the two halves as a sign of the ending of the feud.12 Interview with peace monitor, Mayenjur, July 2018, in Dinka. The ritual ending of impurity and the re-creation of community was crucial.
As a sign of confidence in this peace, in 2016, some people returned to Mayen Jur. In 2017, more people returned and even started to cultivate in the toc. This investment of labour implied a confidence that the toc would be secure enough to make harvest possible. Yet, the toc remained heavily armed and people kept their families at second homes further away. Women only went to the toc for the months of the harvest.
To cement the peace, an Episcopal Church of Sudan (ECS) priest also started a school in Mayen Jur. As elsewhere, this school opening was driven by this priest whose family were in Mayen Jur. The explicit aim in opening the school was to allow the Nuer and Dinka communities to come together and interact peacefully. Through this act of school building, the clergyman wanted to explicitly remake identities and again naturalise the meeting of Nuer and Dinka in these contested borderlands. The school would embody the lack of spiritual and physical danger in these communities meeting together. These dangers had been made through years of war.
However, in the end, this 2016–19 peace in Mayen Jur was only temporary, based on negotiation and ultimately vulnerable to the temporary authority of various leaders. In 2018, Gatdeang died in Mayom, thus removing his guarantee of the peace. In April 2020, President Kiir, through the national army command, called Puljang to Juba. While in Juba he effectively came under house arrest. His power was quickly curtailed by his physical distance from Mayom and his inability to return. Deadly raids occurred between Mayon and Gogrial, with peace easily shattered by shifting politics.
Yet, the profitability of peace had become visible. Again in 2021, commissioners from Mayom and Gogrial East tried to cement peace through trade. A cattle market was established in Gum Mac, on a piece of high land between the nine rivers near Mayen Jur. Here cattle could be bought and traded, with the local governments benefiting from the collection of significant taxes. Yet, the peace was a government peace with significant economic benefits for political leaders. For the cattle keepers and traders, peace felt tentative. In May 2022, when a Dinka trader refused to pay tax, Nuer officials restrained him. He responded with gun fire in the tax office in Gum Mac. Almost instantly, people in Gum Mac divided along ethnic lines and fought. Some saw this as motivated by internal Warrap State politics. Yet, the long unending wars meant that peace was incredibly fragile. The future of peace in Mayen Jur remains unclear.
 
1      Naomi Pendle, ‘Contesting the Militarization of the Places Where They Met: The Landscapes of the Western Nuer and Dinka (South Sudan)’. Journal of Eastern African Studies 11:1 (2017): 64–85. »
2      Ibid. »
3      See Chapter 11 and Joshua Craze, Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi, ‘A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013–15’, HSBA Working Paper 42 (Small Arms Survey, 2016). »
4      Craze et al., ‘A State of Disunity’.  »
5      Interviews with people from Gogrial, in Juba and by telephone, 2019. »
6      Observations of chiefs’ meetings, 2012, Lietnhom. »
7      Interviews with paramount chiefs, 2012 and 2014, Kuajok and Addis Ababa. »
8      Interview with local church leader who attended the peace meeting, 2018. »
9      Interview with sub-chief and member of the Mayenjur peace committee, Mayendjur, July 2018. »
10      Interview with second member of the Mayenjur peace committee, Mayenjur, July 2018, in Dinka. »
11      Interview with sub-chief and member of the Mayenjur peace committee, Mayenjur, July 2018, in Dinka. »
12      Interview with peace monitor, Mayenjur, July 2018, in Dinka. »