A rivalrous hakuma

During the 1990s and 2000s, Paulino Matip dealt in cattle and sorghum to amass a significant wealth and establish his elite role. Through tactical marriages, he also cemented control over Mayom County.1 Joshua Craze, Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi, ‘A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013–15’,HSBA Working Paper 42 (Small Arms Survey, 2016), page 19. In 2005, President Kiir appointed Taban Deng as Governor of Unity State. Previously, Nguen Monytuil (from Mayom) had been the Khartoum-appointed governor. For Kiir, Taban’s governorship limited the rival powers of both Riek Machar and Paulino Matip.2 Craze et al., ‘State of Disunity’, page 28. He deployed the same strategies as previous governments of governing Unity State by dividing the Nuer.3 Ibid.

For many in Unity State, his appointment felt like an external imposition and an indicator of Kiir’s dominance over the states. In 2008, a rally by Kiir in Bentiu was disrupted by chants of ‘Take Taban’.4 International Crisis Group, South Sudan, page 4. The South Sudan Transitional Constitution required that 2 per cent of the oil revenue would go to the state. Yet, even officials in the state government did not know the amount of the transfers, preventing any easy accountability.5 Ibid., pages 4–5. Popular opinion quickly perceived Taban Deng as corrupt and having either personally captured this oil wealth or sent it all back to Juba.

Frustrated with Taban Deng, in 2008, Paulino Matip allied with former enemy Riek Machar to support Nguen Monytuil’s appointment tp the SPLM chairmanship in Unity State. He was elected as in April 2008. Then, the 2010 elections, as committed to in the CPA, brought a significant test of the relationship between South Sudanese, the state government and the Juba government. Taban was eager to remove Monytuil from the chairmanship in case it implied his candidature for the governor in the 2010 elections. First, Monytuil was appointed as Minister of Health in Juba. Then, in his absence from Unity State, Taban Deng reconfigured the state SPLM leadership.6 Craze et al., ‘State of Disunity’, page 29.

Despite the hakuma’s continued military might, they still had anxieties and limits. In practice, as much as the hakuma have claimed divine-like powers, their power as individuals has usually relied on their physical presence and this limits them. A repeated tactic by the Juba government to limit rivalrous claims over the states has been to bring the rival to Juba. Their physical distance from their base of authority has withered their power.

Rivalries over the 2010 election continued. The SPLM’s Unity State Liberation Council initially selected Monytuil as the candidate for Unity State governor, but the process was then brought to Juba and the party’s political bureau selected Taban Deng to the anger of many in Unity State.7 Ibid. In response, those opposing Taban Deng backed Angelina Nyakwech Teny (Riek Machar’s wife) as an independent candidate for the governorship of Unity State.

During the 2010 election, commissioners and other government officials harassed and intimidated voters and polling staff.8 The Carter Center, Observing Sudan’s 2010 National Elections (The Carter Center, 2010), page 45. According to Carter Centre observers, ‘the elections in Unity State suffered from large-scale intimidation, violence, flaws in administration, and indications of manipulation’.9 Ibid., page 167. The state radio station announced the victory of Taban Deng before the National Election Commission had declared the result. Angelina rejected the result. When the resulted were announced, protestors immediately clashed with SPLA forces, with three people killed and many injured.10 Ibid.

In 2010, following his re-election, Taban Deng carried out another forced disarmament campaign in Unity State. For many people this was experienced as an attack on them by the government and the violent imposition of a predatory governor. For example, in April and May 2011, the SPLA carried out a violent disarmament campaign in Mayom, burning villages and preventing humanitarian access in an area that had recently opposed Taban Deng in the elections.11 Joshua Craze, ‘Unclear Lines: State and Non-State Actors in Abyei’, in Christopher Vaughan, Mareike Schomerus and Lotje De Vries (eds), The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 45–66.

Prophet Gatdeang (of Mut Turoah Nyaweach) was a significant prophetic figure in Mayom at the time. Gatdeang’s cattle camp was among those being disarmed, and forces opened fire in their attempts to force the surrender of weapons. One of Gatdeang’s sons was injured. Eight bullets were said to have penetrated the prophet’s garment, and the soldiers left him for dead, but the prophet was not hurt.12 Craze et al., ‘State of Disunity’, page 34.

In response to the elections or to this affront to divine authority, various commanders explicitly rebelled against Taban Deng and the Juba government. This included Matthew Puljang, the nephew of Gatdeang and former supporter of Paulino Matip. These new rebelling forces found support from characters such as Bapiny Monytuil who had opposed the SPLA before the CPA and had refused to follow Matip into the SPLA at the Juba Declaration. Taban Deng was troubled by the array of possible new alliances including the possibility of new forces being integrated into the SPLA. He attacked Paulino Matip’s home in Bentiu while also continuing with disarmament in Mayom.13 Ibid. Fighting continued in Mayom over the next two years. In was in this context, in March 2011, that Peter Gadet defected from the SPLA and based his rebellion at Mayom. From here he could oppose Taban Deng. He could also raid cattle from the toc of Gogrial, both to fund his movement and insult the central government’s ability to provide security in their own homelands.