Conclusion
Churches are part of the cosmic polity; they assert the divinity of God and their divine power. Their claims to be able to demand peace, from the 1970s and into recent years, is a significant part of how they have established their authority among local and international communities, and with the hakuma. Church leaders at a national level have spoken truth to power and demanded accountability and peace from the leaders of the hakuma. They have been publicly outspoken even when free speech generally has been heavily restrained.
Church leaders around the Bilnyang have also tried to establish their authority through peace-making. This came in the context of growing inter-church competition. However, many people have pushed back against this. The peace of the church has been seen as arbitrary and even morally abhorrent for its relinquishing of moral responsibilities to the dead. Forgiveness also brings the dangers of accepting hakuma impunity. The peace of the church is often seen as only for the educated, excluding many of those who implement violence, while the lack of immediate curse from violating the peace of the church leaves its power as ambiguous.
While the church has heavily invested in peace meetings, some of the churches’ most powerful pro-peace actions have been through more daily remakings of the cultural archive, including sometimes with the backing of the militarised power of the hakuma. Through these remakings, church leaders have been able to challenge exclusive communities and have tried to leave space for peace. Church leaders have been able to do this best when they are autochthonous and know the cultural archive well. An example of this is through the church’s control and contestation over a key, wartime burial. There is more to understand about how the church is influencing daily wartime practice in favour of a less violent peace, including through activities such as burial and posthumous care.