Laughing at the Stasi: Humour as a Means of Resistance
Humour and its various forms like satire, cynicism, irony or jokes are a long-established means of social criticism. The subversive nature of humour challenges authority and undermines prevailing ideologies. Humorous depictions of the Stasi were not only a means to circulate knowledge about them but also a way to express critique against the entire surveillance apparatus. Accounts of humour as criticism, subversion, and transgression have been made by thinkers such as Terry Eagleton, Umberto Eco and Peter Sloterdijk on various occasions.
1Holm, “Against the Assault of Laughter,” 32. See also Eagleton, Humour, and Eco, “The Comic and the Rule.” Eagleton’s
Humour (2019) engages with the many functions of this complex phenomenon through history, philosophy and psychoanalysis, focusing on the semiotics of laughter. Replace sentence with: Grappling with the myriad implications and notions of humour, Eagleton suggests “splic[ing] the incongruity thesis”—defined as a break with cognitive or social expectations—” with the release theory”, and concludes that “humour happens for the most part when some fleeting disruption of a well-ordered world of meaning loosens the grip of the reality principle.”
2Eagleton, Humour, 88. It is precisely this releasing effect of all forms of humour that sets social criticism free.
Reflecting on ancient comedy, where the comic serves “only as an instrument of social control,” Umberto Eco outlines “types of comic” that work as a form of social criticism in his essay
The Frames of Comic Freedom (1984).
3Eco, “The Frames of Comic ‘Freedom,’” 7. With reference to Luigi Pirandello’s essay
On Humor (1908),
4Pirandello, “On Humor.” Eco draws an important distinction between humour and the comic which he describes as “an umbrella term covering disparate phenomena.”
5Eco, “The Frames of Comic ‘Freedom,’” 7. He explains that while the comic is the “perception of the opposite” which, in line with theories on incongruity, causes laughter thanks to shared cultural codes, humour is rooted in “the ‘sentiment’ of the opposite,” which “attempts to reestablish and reassert the broken frame.”
6Eco, “The Frames of Comic ‘Freedom,’” 7. Elaborating on this distinction, Eco concludes that whereas comedy takes place within the frames of societal norms (carnival as a case in point), humour allows for a “possibility of transgression,”
7Eco, “The Frames of Comic ‘Freedom,’” 8. subverting those frames. Hence “the performance of humor acts as a form of social criticism.”
8Eco, “The Frames of Comic ‘Freedom,’” 8.Taking a different point of departure, Sloterdijk explores humour as a subversive force in
Kritik der zynischen Vernunft (Critique of Cynical Reason,
1983). Contrasting modern and ancient cynicism (“kynicism”), he carves out two types of social character. Sloterdijk criticises “modern ideology critique” for its detachment from “the powerful traditions of laughter in satirical knowledge, which have their roots in ancient kynicism.”
9Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 16. He argues further that modern cynicism has become an “enlightened false consciousness” which, although still able to recognise critique, has lapsed into a state of resignation and thus fails to put criticism into action. The ancient form of cynicism, however, employs humour, satire, and bodily expression to challenge established norms and authority.
10Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 5–6.The archival material reveals numerous instances where humour was used to criticise the Stasi in the form of sarcastic representations and jokes that trivialised the authority of Stasi officers aligning with the “kynical”
11Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 4. tradition, that is, more generally speaking, with forms of humour that function as subtle social criticism questioning the status quo and offering spaces for resistance. This humorous trivialisation as a strategy is frequently based on the widespread bias against Stasi officers as “stupid” in GDR society. The common typification of the Stasi man as a “langhaariger Typ … von der Staatssicherheit” with a “Notizbuch in seiner Hemdtasche” (long-haired guy from the State Security with a notebook in his shirt pocket)
12Report by IME “Heinrich” on event with Bettina Wegner in the “Allende-Klub” on June 22, 1977, dated June 29, 1977, 260. contributes to these sarcastic and cynical portrayals. Humorous images of Stasi collaborators with notebooks in their shirts became widely recognised stereotypes which also allowed GDR citizens to make light of the repressive surveillance system under which they lived, for “all humour involves” release, a “deflationary effect”, as Eagleton highlights with reference to Freudian theory.
13Eagleton, Humour, 22; see also 11 for a direct reference to Freud’s Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten (Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious). In that sense, humour was not just employed as a personal coping mechanism but also a collective strategy. Such comical representations were shared through “jokes,” both spreading knowledge about the Stasi and offering a subtle but effective way to resist the omnipresent gaze of the Stasi. For example, and as we have seen in chapter 1, Kolbe comments in his interview with Windsor: “Als solches nahm man die Stasi schon wahr, aber das war so wie: Na ja, das sind doch Idioten. Guck mal, die da” (in that sense, you could certainly spot the Stasi, but it was like: “Well, they’re idiots. Look at them over there.”).
14Interview with Uwe Kolbe, June 1, 2021.Humour also became a direct method of confrontation, as seen in the performances of Wegner. She used her situated knowledge of the Stasi and her platform to subtly mock the Stasi officers in the audience, making light of their presence with remarks such as, “Jetzt müßt ihr den Bleistift zücken” (now you need to take out your pencils) or “Notizbuch kann geschlossen werden” (notebook can be closed).
15Report by IME “Heinrich” of event with Bettina Wegner, dated June 29, 1977, 260. In this way, Wegner made the presence of the state security service a theme of her performances, alluding to the stereotypical representations of Stasi officers as men in grey suits who are never without their notebooks and pencils. It becomes evident that jokes and humour were both a weapon of resistance and a way of indicating knowledge—in this case about the Stasi and how its officers might be identified. That such jokes would only have been understood by those “in the know” (that is, those with the necessary knowledge to understand the reference) means that Wegner is here also gesturing towards a shared awareness of the “public secret” of surveillance. By integrating such humour into her performances, Wegner not only resisted the Stasi’s monitoring of her but also created a space where shared understanding of the “public secret” of surveillance could foster solidarity and create a subtle form of collective resistance.
The fragile and unreliable nature of this kind of knowledge is hinted at by IME “Heinrich” who recounts that the result on one occasion was “ein regelrechter Verfolgungswahn”
16Report by IME “Heinrich” of event with Bettina Wegner, dated June 29, 1977, 260. (a real persecution complex) in which people were suspected of being informants by the mere fact that they were unfriendly or had a notebook in their pocket. This highlights the pervasive anxiety fostered by the Stasi, where even the most mundane actions were imbued with suspicion. Humour, in this sense, acted as a way to cope with and critique the absurdities of the surveillance state, turning the Stasi’s attempts at control into a subject of ridicule. These were all attempts to demystify the Stasi by portraying them as foolish bureaucrats, rendering their power and authority as less intimidating. Humour thus served as both as form of knowledge acquisition as well as circulation and an important strategy for critique, offering a way to challenge the status quo while simultaneously providing a means for the oppressed to reclaim some measure of agency.
At the same time, it becomes clear that there is a tension in the way the Stasi is represented in the primary material, as it is depicted both as an all-seeing and powerful entity and as a figure of fun whom people made jokes about as a form of release and resistance. This tension exposes the fragility of the Stasi’s claim to epistemic authority: while the organisation positioned itself as the ultimate knower, these mocking representations highlight the gap between its totalising self-image and the everyday realities experienced by citizens. Humour and irony thus functioned as a form of epistemic resistance, allowing citizens to reassert their capacity to interpret and narrate their own social reality in the face of an oppressive regime seeking to monopolise truth.
This dynamic is particularly evident in the following IM report detailing the activities of Schlesinger and Wegner, in which the officers’ inability to interpret an obvious situation, and the self-parodying tone of their exchange, inadvertently highlight their incompetence in a way that borders on the humorous and reveals the very cracks in epistemic authority that citizens often targeted:
Als wir mit dem Klaus runtergegangen sind und wir dann in die U-Bahn gegangen sind, ist dir da was aufgefallen? Was ist dir denn da aufgefallen? Na, daß da jemand stand, der Schl. aufgefallen sein könnte.
Du meinst also, daß der Mann, der dort stand, mit einem relativ mittellangen Haar, straff durchgekämmt, braunen Mantel an, Brillenträger, dort einen Beobachtungsposten bezogen hat …
Du meinst also, daß Schlesinger aus der Existenz dieser Person zu diesem Zeitpunkt, an diesem Ort hat schließen können, daß er überwacht wird … das ist
natürlich eine nicht konkrete Absicherung der Dinge.
17Report by IM “Karl,” in OV “Schreiberling,” dated December 8, 1976, 273. Emphasis added.[When we went downstairs with Klaus and then went into the subway, did you notice anything? What did you notice there? Well, that there was someone standing there who might have noticed Schl. So you mean that the man who was standing there, with relatively medium-length hair, tightly combed, wearing a brown coat and glasses, had taken up an observation post … So you mean that Schlesinger could have concluded from the existence of this person at that time, in that place, that he was being watched … that is of course a non-concrete safeguarding of things.]
The passage above describes a conversation about whether an individual was under surveillance, noting the absurdity of the situation. The lack of quick understanding, suggested by the questioning or the need to confirm an otherwise obvious fact, seems to shore up the stereotype of the stupidity of Stasi employees. The questioning, as if confirming an obvious fact—“You mean that Schlesinger could deduce from the presence of this person at this location that he was being watched?”—exemplifies the stereotype of Stasi employees as overly cautious and, at times, clueless. This depiction plays into the widespread narrative of the Stasi as a force incapable of achieving real control, adding a layer of irony to the situation. Moreover, the rhetorics of the reporting IM—repetitive gestures and ironical tone—seem to suggest that they are parodying themselves. As we shall see in chapter 4, humour and satire was also employed by writers in their fictional representations of the MfS, which also circulated as forms of knowledge in the literary sphere.