New principles of agricultural development through digitization
As the empirical insights illustrate – from the more general objectives and development concepts in documents on the digitalization of agriculture in the Global South, the formation of a community of practice in the professional context of conferences and workshops, as well as the implementation in a pilot project in southern Tanzania – the turn towards digital technologies entails more than just technological change within the persistent search for technological fixes. It also brings with it a change in the character of agricultural development, which expresses itself most distinctively in three different, yet related principles of technological solutionism in development: datafication, gamification, and experimentation. All three are symptomatic not only of current development practice but also of other fields experiencing a digital transformation.
Datafication
Data has become a valuable global commodity. But it is much more than simply Information: in expert hands, it is intelligence. (CGIAR Platform for Big Data in Agriculture, https://bigdata.cgiar.org/about-the-platform/)
Service providers – and farmers – should not treat data as just a resource, but as an asset. […] Farmers should treat their data as their property, not just information shared with others. (USAID 2018: 42)
Reports, conference presentations, and project staff members all wish to accelerate data-driven agricultural development. So far, however, the quality of a project is primarily being defined by the quality of the data rather than its effects on agricultural development. In the recent report by CTA data is even referred to ‘as the new oil’ (Dalberg Advisors and CTA 2019: 11), since ‘for Africa it is certainly the case that data might be the fuel that drives the transformation of smallholder farming and keeps the continent on track’ (ibid.). When examining the projects, it becomes evident that data means knowledge. As expressed in a lightning talk, ‘technology is not a magical solution, but it targets the lack of reliable information’ (Speaker at ICT4ag conference, 2018). Data is not only considered as exact and objective, but it even appears as if data is currently the only ‘real’ knowledge, ‘making socio-economic organization more sophisticated’ (Cherlet 2014: 778). This also has an impact on who is considered as an expert, now privileging those able to program the software and analyse the data.
When data can be used at scale it shall ultimately guide decision-making. Moreover, data is money as it can, for example, be sold to agrochemical companies (Interview with Kenyan entrepreneur, 2018). And, as we could briefly illustrate with regard to the pilot project in the Mbeya region (see Figure 3.2 for data collection in the pilot project), data also means power and control. Data from satellites, drones, or sensors as well as records of text messages not only provides a means of surveillance of crop growth, but also allows for intimate insights into the activities and performance of extension officers and farmers. In the long run, artificial intelligence and automation shall make their jobs obsolete, shifting control even more to those in front of the screen elsewhere. And, as formulated in the announcement of the convention in Nairobi, ‘newer digital innovations, including machine learning, the expansion of connected sensor technologies, and robotics – promise more dramatic changes in the farming landscape in the near future’ (field notes from Big Data for Agriculture Convention, Nairobi 2018).
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Description: The photo shows two people standing outside under a tree in front of a rice field....
Figure 3.2. Data collection in the rice fields of southern Tanzania [Photo: A. Matejcek].
Gamification
‘Data, data, data!!! We don’t have time for basic research or basic innovations…’ (Breakout-Group Speaker at Big Data for Agriculture Convention, Nairobi, 2018)
Instead of ‘basic research’, what drives this field is new investment strategies and sales pitches to attract private funding. Telecom operators regularly run competitions such as, for example, the Orange African Social Venture Prizes, or the MTN app competition challenges to include agriculture as one of the themes for which applications can be developed (see e.g. AGRA 2015). Moreover, being confronted with the YoBloCo Awards, Plug&Play Days, the Inspire Challenge, AgriHack activities, amplify.org, or the Africa Teen Geek Competition, it is striking how the field is increasingly characterized by what has been described as gamification. As Tulloch and Randell-Moon (2018: 204) put it, ‘gamification can be understood as the extension of the principles and mechanics of game-play: rules, points, rewards, leaderboards, and so on into “real-world tasks”’. Even online courses use a points system to make participants engage more, for example, giving points for posts to the online forum, for watching a video or simply for downloading course material (Online Course 2018). The Mahindi Master uses game simulations as a way to teach farmers about fertilizer inputs in relation to different soil types. And in the Inspire Challenge, the new actors of agricultural development introduced above – innovators, start-ups, and entrepreneurs – are encouraged to partner with the well-established CGIAR institutes to produce interoperable datasets. As the CTA report confirms, ‘prize money won in various competitions is a common source of funding. The benefit of this approach is that there are fewer or none of the strong requirements for how the funds can be utilized – as is often the case with grants’ (CTA 2017: 31). While, at first sight, this may seem like a win-win situation for both, it also highlights unequal power dynamics. The conventional centres of power are no longer creating knowledge, but rather ‘curate knowledge production in multiple locations around the globe’ (Tulloch & Randell-Moon 2018: 218). However, most decisions, for example, on who wins and gets the funding, are still made by those working for the big organizations. Another consequence of this, as Schwittay and Braund emphasize, is that it is mainly the process that has changed, rather than the selected ideas (Schwittay and Braund 2017).
Experimentation
The dominant role of large development organizations, as well as the new relevance of technological experts and digital infrastructures, means that many of the technological innovations that are designed to address agricultural development are still being developed in the Global North. These are then ‘tested’ in the Global South – in our case, Eastern Africa – in order to generate a gradual process of technological appropriation. Pilot studies, in particular, are used to detect technological errors, train the different actors involved, facilitate external funding, and explore upscaling opportunities (see e.g. ITU 2017). As the GIZ has pointed out:
Cyclic innovation, trial and error, prototyping, rapid learning, adaptation and re-adaptation are typical characteristics of modern ICT-development processes that do not always easily match with more thoughtful, longer and slower processes of project design, implementation and evaluation of ‘traditional’ development agencies and implementing organizations. (GIZ 2016: 5)
This clearly aligns with the new mode of experimentation which is currently being observed in development practice (Donovan 2018, Berndt and Boeckler 2016, Berndt 2015, Webber 2014). Instead of transferring an established technology to the ‘developing world’, ‘contemporary technology aspirations increasingly articulate and practice the Global South as a live laboratory for technological experimentation’ (Fejerskov 2017: 947). As Fejerskov has pointed out, focusing on the work of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, ‘innovation and high-risk engagement and experimentation apply not only to technology but extend far into the private and social realms of people’ (Fejerskov 2017: 955). While failing becomes a legitimate outcome in the learning process of technology experts, it is often unclear what a failed project means for the local population involved. With regard to the farmers, at least in the projects we studied, it appears as if – based on past negative experiences with development projects – expectations remain low. Some ethnographic insights even indicate diverse forms of resistance to and subversion of the new principles of digital transformation. Finally, it often seems unclear to what extent the experiments will eventually serve the ‘development’ of the communities, or whether they will just serve the development of the technologies themselves. The balancing act between testing and development continues to be a daily occurrence in projects, as well as the field more generally.
Conclusion
At least since the institutionalization of ‘development’ in the mid-20th century, attempts to strengthen rural livelihoods in Africa – as elsewhere in the world – have strongly relied on technological solutions. The idea of a technological fix for low agricultural outputs certainly characterizes the majority of ‘development’ interventions in this field. While once irrigation schemes were built, tractors were shipped, or pesticides were sold under the pretext of agricultural modernization, an increasing uptake of digital technologies can be observed in the last decades. In this contribution, we have shown that this latest shift in the long history of technological approaches to agricultural development is more than just a turn to other technologies. Through document analysis, event ethnographies and participant observation in projects on the digitalization of agriculture in Kenya and Tanzania it became apparent that new actors and new visions have emerged which have considerably changed the mechanisms through which agricultural futures are supposed to be realized. In addition to the major development organizations and the numerous NGOs active in the sector, big-technology firms have entered the scene. Moreover, innovative start-ups and software developers all over the world participate in developing technological solutions to what is still one of the most pertinent issues of development in Africa. These new and old actors meet at the many conferences, workshops and fairs where new project ideas are ‘pitched’, discussed, and evaluated.
Here, it was interesting for us to observe the insignificant role assigned to the social sciences in such events, reminding us of Weinberg’s provocative assumption that technology, by offering shortcuts to social problems, could make the social sciences obsolete (Weinberg 1993). Indeed, current visions of ICT4D, Data4D, and D4Ag appear to be based on universal expert knowledge about development problems and how they can be solved by presenting political, economic and social challenges as technical ones. In this way, knowledge is removed from its context: as apparently neutral, technologically collected and processed, information is to be conveyed to the rural population of the Global South to foster development. While the complex coming-together of these visions and respective programmes on the one hand, and the local settings and interests on the other, are hardly addressed at these events, they become most striking when following these ideas and the technologies to the villages and fields of farmers.
Visiting both professional events and the sites where projects shall be implemented in Kenya and Tanzania, the new principles that come along with the digital transformation of agricultural development become clear. Projects striving for increased agricultural productivity are characterized by datafication, gamification, and experimentation. As our empirical research shows, all three of these processes have severe implications, especially regarding the power relations in this field where farmers are more and more moved to the background. Overall, the principles of datafication, gamification, and experimentation as observed in the context of East African agricultural development signify the ongoing depoliticization in visions of rural futures. Instead, attention is often devoted primarily to the development of technologies and their potential rather than to the rural population and the actual (in)effectiveness of these technologies. Thus, when visiting those in the fields it is striking to experience the difference between the enthusiasm and euphoria expressed on paper and at the many events currently taking place, one the one hand, and the frustration among those turning these ideas into practice, on the other. As one of the technology experts admits:
[…] nothing has really changed on the ground. [Maybe] it would be better to distribute technologies through private businesses … or it would be better to just give the farmers a tractor … I don’t know! (Interview with technology expert based in Israel, Dar es Salaam, 21.07.2019)
Considering the history of technology in agricultural development, this would leave us back where it all began. Thus, even though digital technologies still promise a better future for agricultural development, our empirical research indicates that for the farmers, at least, the future might not turn out to be that different after all.
The long history of technology in agricultural development in the Global South looks back on a series of failed investments, a lack of radical change and an ongoing search for the obstacles and their remedies (Wiggins 2014, Jones 2005). A number of studies diagnose the ongoing digital technology uptake in agriculture as inadequate because not enough technology is in place in quantitative terms. There is often talk of little adoption or low scaling. This is commonly blamed on a lack of funding, will, skill or enabling environment (Abdulai 2022, Ayim et al. 2022, Baumüller and Addom 2020).
Some countries, such as Tanzania, with 78 mobile phones per hundred inhabitants, show that in some cases long-standing global inequalities persist. Looking at the global distribution of smartphones and internet access per capita, for example, these in turn reflect the digital divide quite clearly in general (ITU 2023) as well as in farming in particular (Mehrabi et al. 2021). Nevertheless, most high-tech products today do not come from the Global North and are therefore not necessarily more expensive and unaffordable compared to wages in the Global South. In some Asian countries, there are three times as many mobile phones per hundred inhabitants as in many European countries: South Africa, Ghana, and Botswana, for example, have more phones per capita than Germany (ITU 2023). Of course, this says nothing about the quality of the technologies or their distribution in these countries. For regions with weak infrastructure, it is still difficult to ensure the supply of technologies and basic training in their use (Unwin 2009, Murphy and Carmody 2015). For example, the predominant language of these technologies is still English, both in terms of application and programming. The cultural dimension of these technologies, which focus on Eurocentric and Western content, needs to be taken into account (Kshetri and Dholakia 2009).
Therefore, the ‘global digital divide’ cannot be reduced to unequal access to mobile phones, computers, and the internet alone. The long-standing political, social, and economic inequalities behind it must also be taken into account (Kshetri and Dholakia 2009: 1664, following UNCTAD 2006). This apparent problem of having or not having technologies, in turn, seems to have many dimensions: ‘The digital divide entails several gaps’ (Kshetri and Dholakia 2009: 1668), such as free markets, capital, technologies, know-how, stability, democracy, and equality (Ouma et al. 2019: 345–6). Hence, the idea that if the tractor has not sparked a revolution, the mobile phone will, rather seems to rule out many desirable futures for rural Africa (Groves 2017).