This chapter will demonstrate the correlation between religious beliefs and FGM/C prevalence using Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) data over twenty years. We then show how religious beliefs influence social and legal norms and explore evidence on engaging religious leaders to shift these norms.

We argue that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating from a secular perspective have struggled to engage with the complexity of religiously-informed social norms, relying on high-level statements to effect change at a local level without significant results. This chapter posits that the religious drivers of FGM/C are complex, rooted in social and collective identity, and that public declarations against the practice by religious leaders alone are ineffective. Instead, a transformational approach engaging religious leaders and shifting religious norms is needed, encouraging the disentanglement of religious beliefs from FGM/C through the lens of collective religious norms and social identity.

The authors of this chapter work for the Orchid Project, an international NGO committed to working with grassroots organisations, through advocacy and research, to support communities to abandon FGM/C. As part of the research team, the authors observed the influence of religious beliefs on FGM/C practice. This chapter reflects on the influence of religiously-informed social norms and contributes to the dialogue on this important aspect of the FGM/C response.

The practice of FGM/C is not associated with any religion, and there have been public statements by high-level scholars of various religions, primarily Islam and Christianity, delinking FGM/C from theology. Significant work has been conducted through partnerships between UNICEF and the International Islamic Center for Population Studies and Research (IICPSR) at Al-Azhar University in Egypt to engage theologically with FGM/C. Examples include the Islamic Ruling on Male and Female Circumcision by Islamic scholar Muhammad Lufti Al-Sabbagh (Serour and Ragab 2013); a joint report by the IICPSR and the Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical and Social Services (BLESS) for the Coptic Orthodox Church and UNICEF, which stated that FGM/C has no basis in Christianity or Islam (UNICEF 2016); and the updating of resources such as Female Circumcision (FGM/C). Between the Incorrect Use of Science and Misunderstood Doctrine (UNICEF 2019). Despite these high-level statements, the belief that FGM/C is a religious requirement persists in many parts of the world and influences decision-making about the practice. Religious beliefs are particularly challenging to engage with, as they are deeply personal and intertwined with culture and social identity. Where patriarchal religious beliefs are held, and where there is a cultural tradition of practising FGM/C, religion can be used to legitimise and drive the practice.

A social norm is defined as ‘expectations or informal rules shared by people in a group or society as to how people should behave’ (Mackie et al. 2015; Plan International and 28 Too Many 2022; Sood et al. 2020; see also the Introduction to this volume). For a social norm to influence behaviour, five key elements must be in place:

Together, these five elements produce a social norm that is reinforced over time and can often be embedded as a component of culture or social identity. Religious beliefs interact with each of the five elements to produce a religiously-informed social norm.

Le Roux, Bartelink and Palm (2017) conducted a qualitative study of engagement with Muslim and Christian religious leaders across Africa to address harmful traditional practices that included FGM/C and child marriage. According to these authors, two types of engagement are primarily used by religious leaders on issues related to harmful traditional practices: the health risks approach and the theological approach (ibid.:30). What was most effective, according to their case study review of Muslim and Christian faith-based organisations, was engagement with social norms through a lens of theology and religious beliefs. The study recommended small discussion groups, created with sensitivity to the power dynamics between participants and faith leaders, including only participants who volunteered to take part. Facilitators should lead with the primary goal of building trust, using sensitive language to create openness and lack of judgment within the group. Contextual theological engagement was a helpful framing for these groups to utilise a framing and language that resonated with participants (ibid.:7).

Using sacred scriptures, including the Quran and the Bible, as the basis of the intervention is ‘a way of engaging faith leaders in terms that they are comfortable with, that they trust, and on which they see themselves as experts’ (le Roux, Bartelink and Palm 2017:30). The use of sacred texts creates an increased likelihood of trust within dialogues and openness to reconsidering previously held beliefs about FGM/C, as well as reducing the risks of backlash and opposition (ibid.:30). The theological approach requires a certain degree of religious legitimacy and knowledge of FGM/C prevention actors carrying out interventions. Faith-based organisations are arguably much better positioned than secular actors in interpreting and engaging with sacred scriptures and implementing this approach (ibid.:39).

Despite the proposed effectiveness of participatory approaches in engaging with religiously-informed social norms, Palm, le Roux and Bartelink state that:

Any approach that engages with religiously-informed social norms must first engage from a theologically-informed perspective, but even in so doing, if programming and policy fail to engage with local power dynamics and fail to understand the influence of religious leaders, participatory dialogues will be less effective or have no impact.

There is a variety of types of ‘religious leader’. What must be understood is the pathways of influence that each type of leader has through power and stakeholder mapping prior to their engagement in dialogues. Research has demonstrated that religious leaders have considerable influence in their communities, but their influence is dependent on legitimacy among the groups they serve (Østebø and Østebø 2014:2). What must be critically engaged are the characteristics and factors that contribute to legitimacy, and the pathways of power that exist within different religious traditions. It is insufficient to gather religious leaders with the expectation of trickle-down effects.

Religious identity across Africa is complex and closely aligned with ethnicity, social networks, and collective rather than individual identity. Many people in Africa, as well as other parts of the world, do not separate their religious, cultural, or ethnic identities but see them as intertwined or, at times, one and the same (Hayford and Trinitapoli 2011:5). According to Abbink (2014:85), religion can be defined as ‘a belief in the existence and workings of spiritual beings or divine forces, and the recognition of an invisible order or reality that affects humans and their behaviour. Religion in this sense is, in principle, value-neutral and often seen as a fact of being in the world.’ The lines between religious, ethnic, and other social identities are often blurred, with religious beliefs being integral to people’s worldview, rather than being a distinct and separate belief system. In a number of African countries, people feel that adherence to religion is necessary to uphold moral values and be good people (Lugo and Cooperman 2010:15). In addition, categories of religion have been largely imposed from outside the communities who practise such religions, particularly in the case of what are known as African Traditional Religions, a category created by missionaries and academics who viewed religion through a lens of Judeo-Christian framing (Shaw 1990). This framing creates a lack of understanding of the vast religious diversity across Africa and the many ways in which people identify.

Adamczyk and Hayes’ 2012 study on religion and sexual behaviours concludes that religious texts prescribe certain behaviours and social guidelines associated with religious life. They further argue that when a substantial proportion of a population adheres to a set of religious beliefs, this can influence how restrictions become formalised into legal norms (ibid.:724). Religion has long been a powerful force in shaping social and legal norms globally, often intertwined with cultural and institutional systems (Beaman 2020:18). From sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR) to policies on LGBTQ+ rights, slavery, and geopolitical conflicts, religious ideologies influence public policy, societal attitudes, and legal frameworks.

In terms of FGM/C, religiously-informed social norms have had a notable influence on legal norms, particularly in countries with a high prevalence. In countries such as Somalia and Somaliland, there has been pushback from religious leaders and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) on zero tolerance legislation and policy. A fatwa (a religious declaration relevant to followers of Islam) issued in 2018 in Somaliland banned pharaonic cutting (WHO Type 3 or infibulation), but did not ban other types of FGM/C.4Bhalla, N. (7 February 2018). ‘Somaliland issues fatwa banning female genital mutilation’, Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somaliland-issues-fatwa-banning-female-genital-mutilation-idUSKBN1FR2R9/ [Accessed 21 October 2025]. Similarly, religious leaders in The Gambia pushed to repeal the FGM/C law after traditional cutters were prosecuted under the law (Ferragamo 2024).

This intersection of theology and public policy is often referred to as public theology and is a space where theological ideas, values, and perspectives are engaged with in public discourse to address societal, cultural, and moral issues (Ali 1995:67; Jacobsen 2012; Kim 2011). There are several influences on the public sphere, including the media, government, academics, markets, and civil society (Kim 2011:13). In addition to these, Kim also recognises the role of religious communities within the public sphere, affecting beliefs and practices through public discourse. Public theology can have both negative and positive effects. We explore one example of the positive impact of public theology and consider its implications for religious discourse around FGM/C.

A positive example of public theology is the reinterpretation of baptism among Yezidi sex slaves in the Badinan province of Kurdistan, Iraq (Fisher and Zagros 2019). Many Yezidi community members were subject to sexual violence and sexual slavery at the hands of the Islamic State (ISIS), and in traditional Yezidi custom, a Yezidi who marries a non-Yezidi or who is violated by one is banished from the community and seen as defiled. Many Yezidi women reported that ISIS men who violated them knew of this custom and exploited it intentionally. In February 2015, Baba Sheikh, the Yezidi religious head, issued a decree that Yezidi women who had been defiled at the hands of ISIS would not be banished but could be re-baptised and no longer seen as haram, or considered to be impure. The Yezidi tradition includes baptism, sometimes on an annual basis, so this decree built on existing religious practices but adapted them to suit the political and social situation faced by Yezidis. One estimate stated that 2,600 Yezidi women, girls, boys, and men were baptised and reintegrated into the Yezidi community as a result of this decree (Fisher and Zagros 2019:211). This example demonstrates the positive power of public theology in resolving complex and conflictual social issues such as the reintegration of sex slaves within Yezidi communities. It also demonstrates the potential for religious leaders in areas where FGM/C is prevalent to use their influence to address the harm caused by the practice.

In the case of FGM/C, public theology has had mixed effects. The 2018 fatwa in Somaliland is credited with creating a shift in type of FGM/C from WHO Type 3 (infibulation) to ‘less severe’ forms (Bhalla 2018, see note 4 above). These less severe forms are known as sunnah, which is understood within Islam as a body of practices that are recommended but not required. FGM/C that is referred to as sunnah has been reported to be any type of FGM/C from a small prick to infibulation with fewer stitches than before (Johansson et al. 2021:2; see also Alassad, Chapter 7; Ahmed and Newell-Jones, Chapter 5; and the Afterword, this volume). Some activists see this as progress within a harm-reduction model, while others see it as further embedding the practice within religious beliefs. A study conducted in 2023 by the Ifrah Foundation, a prominent NGO working against FGM/C in Somalia, interviewed religious leaders about FGM/C. One Somali Muslim scholar said, ‘the Ministry of Religious Affairs has tried several times to bring all scholars together in order to issue a fatwa that forbids FGM, but those efforts were fruitless. It’s forbidden to perform any circumcision that is contrary to the religion which involves cutting and sewing up’ (Grassroots Research and Ifrah Foundation 2023:11). Not all examples of public theology on the issue of FGM/C are as complex or negative. In 2007, two girls died in Egypt as a result of complications from FGM/C (Barsoum et al. 2011). This prompted government action to address the issue and led to the establishment of the FGM-Free Village Program in Upper and Lower Egypt. The project engaged in national-level advocacy with religious scholars and contributed to the fatwa by the Grand Mufti of Egypt in 2007, who condemned FGM/C (ibid.:3). In an evaluation of the project, the joint efforts of sheikhs and Catholic priests to counsel and advise against FGM/C within their communities created the opportunity for families to reconsider their views. This did not always result in abandonment, but in some cases, combined with concerns about the harm of FGM/C, the willingness of the extended family to accept an uncut girl, and a shifting social landscape without social sanctions for uncut girls, the religious dialogue provided a stepping stone toward the decision of parents to not have their daughters cut (ibid.:20).

Although people of all faiths practise FGM/C (Christian, African traditional religions, animist religions, Islam), this false link exists primarily among those of Muslim faith. FGM/C is also prevalent in Christian communities in most of the countries under review. In two of those countries, Ethiopia and Nigeria, national prevalence, population size, and the proportion of Christian communities (61.2 per cent and 47.4 per cent respectively) contributed to reflection on the importance of Christian theology related to FGM/C. Notably, most Ethiopians do not view the practice as a religious requirement, whereas Nigerians do. Christian Ethiopians who practise FGM/C are predominantly Orthodox and Protestant, while Nigerians are predominantly Pentecostal and Catholic. While none of these denominations hold positions that explicitly support FGM/C, it is likely that theologies of chastity, purity, and patriarchy provide a framework in which the cultural norm of FGM/C finds tacit support.

It is not the case that the majority of those who practise FGM/C are Muslim. What is demonstratable with data is that the majority of people who believe that FGM/C is a requirement of their religion are Muslim, and that the majority of Muslim people who practise FGM/C are part of the Shafi’i tradition or school of thought.

Data from large-scale national surveys, such as Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), include questions on whether people believe that FGM/C is a requirement of their religion. For those who believe this is true, this influences the social norms related to FGM/C in each element of the social norm structure (reference group, descriptive norms, injunctive norms, sanctions, and social beliefs).

DHS surveys provide nationally representative population data on various health factors that impact women and children. Within the DHS, there is an optional set of twenty-one questions which explore the prevalence of FGM/C, as well as beliefs and attitudes related to the practice. Question three, which asks participants if they have been circumcised, is used to calculate FGM/C prevalence. Answers to the final question, which asks respondents if they think the practice should be continued, is used to determine attitudes, while answers to question twenty (do you believe that FGM/C is a requirement of your religion?) are used to determine how FGM/C is connected or not to religious beliefs. DHS surveys are conducted approximately every five years and, in countries where FGM/C is practised, the survey questions are broadly similar, making the data comparable over time and between countries.

This analysis is based on answers to questions three, twenty, and twenty-one within the section of questions on FGM/C in DHS surveys extracted from STATcompiler, a database of all DHS survey data which can be downloaded for further analysis (ICF 2012)552 ICF (2012). The DHS Program STATcompiler. http://www.statcompiler.com [Accessed 21 July 2025]. for twenty countries. Added to this is Somali data collected by the Somali government (Directorate of National Statistics 2020) which was collected using the DHS FGM/C module (Table 4.1).

Countries were selected to explore data in varied contexts with different compositions of religious and ethnic groups and varying prevalence of FGM/C. The twenty countries included in this study are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, and Togo.

Proportions were calculated by dividing the percentage of women who believe FGM/C is a religious requirement (r) by prevalence (p); and dividing those who believe that FGM/C should continue (a) by prevalence (p).

The twenty countries in this analysis fall broadly into three clusters:

The analysis above suggests that those who consider FGM/C to be a religious requirement are predominantly Muslim (Liu 2014). However, as the analysis also demonstrates, not all followers of the Muslim faith view FGM/C as a religious requirement. This belief is more common among certain schools of thought within Islam, and cannot be associated with the religion as a whole.

There are four major schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi’i. ‘The various schools of Islamic jurisprudence have held differing views on the practice [of FGM], including as to whether the state can force a Muslim to submit to circumcision, or can prohibit the practice all together.’855 Wodon 2015:85.

Shafi’i jurisprudence is significant in five of the countries under review in this study – Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Tanzania. While only one of those countries is predominantly Muslim, almost all the practising Muslim communities in four of the five countries are ethnically Somali and, within that community, the practice is viewed as obligatory. It should be noted that the Shafi’i school of thought is dominant in other parts of the world (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Iraqi Kurdistan), where the belief that FGM/C is a requirement of religion is also common.

The UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme supports engagement with religious and traditional leaders. According to the evaluation of Phase III (2018–21), the programme had engaged religious leaders to speak publicly about the practice and delink it from religion (UNFPA-UNICEF 2021:56). NGOs such as Tostan and Care International take a similar approach, working with Islamic religious leaders to promote the theology of bodily integrity, as mentioned in Islam (Muteshi and Sass 2005:19). The African Union’s Saleema Initiative, a regional initiative to amplify the work of African Union member states toward ending FGM/C (see Alassad, Chapter 7), works with religious and traditional leaders to ‘drive country-level action through existing interventions and programmes’ (African Union 2022:12). Religious and traditional leaders are widely acknowledged as key stakeholders, and their roles in changing social norms are recognised. Based on Matanda et al.:

As outlined above, there is growing global recognition among NGOs, academics, religious leaders from various religions, and within communities where FGM/C is practised of the correlation between religious beliefs and the prevalence of FGM/C and, as a result, an increased interest in working with religious leaders as a means to shift behaviours toward abandonment.

When discussing engaging with religious leaders, we must clearly define what this refers to. In each religious tradition there is a hierarchy of leadership, and the term ‘religious leader’ can refer to ‘imams, pastors, priests, sheikhs, and other religious authorities. Religious leaders are individuals who are recognised by their faith community, playing authoritative and influential leadership roles within faith institutions to guide, inspire, or lead others (of faith)’ (le Roux, Bartelink and Palm 2017:12). NGO discourse has unhelpfully lumped all ‘religious leaders’ together without sufficient understanding of the power dynamics, influence, and authority that each leader has in different spheres. Many NGOs engage with religious scholars at the intellectual level. These scholars may influence local communities, but in many spaces, they are detached from the realities of community life and have little influence on the decision-making process within households.

In a religiously-oriented approach in Wajir, Kenya (Abdi and Askew 2009), FRONTIERS11FRONTIERS was a USAID-funded programme implemented in Kenya by the Population Council with the Somali ethnic community. led a process of engagement with religious scholars to delink Islam from FGM/C. The project engaged Somali Muslim scholars who had completed either a diploma or degree in Islamic studies and who could speak Arabic fluently. Non-Somali scholars were engaged in facilitating dialogue, and Islamic Shariah formed the basis for discussions. Regional scholars were selected from four districts in the (then) North Eastern Province of Kenya (Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, and Ijara) and from Moyale, Marsabit, Isiolo, and Tana River, all areas where FGM/C is highly prevalent. Scholars from Saudi Arabia and Sudan were invited to speak at a regional symposium following regional dialogues. The project was successful in laying out a theological argument to delink FGM/C from Islam. The study report found that religious scholars ‘can play a critical and influential role in community education and encouragement of FGM/C abandonment. However, these scholars are members of their community and most still support all the cultural reasons for the practice’ (Abdi and Askew 2009:27). Religious leaders are custodians of culture in many places, but are also influenced by the cultural and social norms that exist within communities.

In their 2014 study, Østebø and Østebø explored the challenges of NGOs working with religious leaders in Ethiopia. A Christian NGO facilitated dialogue with Muslim leaders in the lowland districts of south-eastern Ethiopia. Islamic ulama (scholars) were invited together with traditional leaders to a two-day workshop on harmful traditional practices. Ulama from the highland zonal capital of Robe were invited to facilitate. In the workshop, religious leaders were portrayed as a ‘vehicle for development’ ((Østebø and Østebø 2014:3). The authors state that: ‘Although we acknowledge the transformative potential of religious leadership, we here challenge the tendency to portray the involvement of religious leaders as a magic bullet in development interventions in general and in anti-FGM campaigns in particular’ (ibid.).

Østebø and Østebø utilise a lens of power developed by Foucault, in which he states: ‘power is, rather, a mode of action upon the actions of others, which only exists when it is exercised’ (Foucault 1982:779). This lens acknowledges the importance of the dynamic and relational aspects of power, especially in contexts characterised by authoritative structures. In many spaces, there is a contradiction between the attempt to engage in participatory dialogue with the involvement of religious leaders who exert authority and the traditional dominance model. Religious leaders are often brought into dialogue because of their influence and assumed power over communities, yet in a participatory manner, which can, in some cases, create clashes.

Østebø and Østebø state that:

In this study, the lowland ulama were critical of the fact that the NGO had brought in the highland ulama in the first place, saying ‘the project should have involved us before calling the sheikhs from ol irra [the highlands]’ (ibid.:16). In addition, political allegiances created further distrust of the highland ulama as they were seen as being aligned with the ruling government party and pushing a political agenda. The dialogues ultimately failed because of the misunderstanding of power dynamics, utilisation of a power over model rather than a truly participatory model, and a non-dialogical approach in which a particular position (zero tolerance) was promoted rather than discussed (ibid.:9).

Research on the bridge between the ‘sacred and the secular’ began to highlight religion’s role in decision-making and as a source of social authority (Ives et al. 2024:10). In Horcea-Milcu et al. (2023:5), the authors argue that when religion is approached as changeable rather than as a stable set of beliefs and values, participatory modes of engagement can be pursued that allow for deliberation and reflection on values.

In summary, this chapter concludes that there is a demonstrable connection between religious beliefs and FGM/C prevalence; similarly, there is a demonstrable correlation between religious beliefs and the belief that FGM/C should continue. These beliefs exist primarily within Muslim communities, and many of them are within the Shafi’i school of thought.

Public theology has the potential to influence the beliefs and practices of families and individuals through shifting public discourse, legal and policy influence, and local-level dialogue. However, secular NGOs engaging in dialogue with religious leaders on theological issues have had limited effect. Instead, organisations, activists, and policy makers working toward the abandonment of FGM/C must engage in dialogues from a religiously-informed perspective, recognising the nuanced variations between religious traditions. Within these dialogues, a non-judgmental and non-directive approach implemented over a long period of time can create an opportunity to reconsider religiously-informed social norms. It is critical that power dynamics and the influence of the different types of religious leaders within religious traditions are recognised and that these dynamics are engaged in a positive way to catalyse change. It is our position that utilising a transformative approach that engages deeply with religious beliefs and religious power structures, while also acknowledging the influence of other drivers of FGM/C, can have a lasting impact on the practice in communities where it is culturally embedded and falsely entwined with religion.

However, the debate is complex and multifaceted. While some bioethicists argue for universal human rights that prioritise individual autonomy, others suggest that cultural practices deserve respect and understanding. The Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries in Africa takes a nuanced approach, criticising the oversimplified and sensationalised portrayal of FGM/C in Western media. This perspective suggests that some women who have undergone these procedures view them positively, challenging the narrative that FGM/C universally results in harm.

The medicalisation of FGM/C, where the procedure is performed in clinical settings, adds another layer to the ethical debate. Some view this as a harm reduction strategy, while others argue that it legitimises a practice that should be eradicated altogether. Bioethicists also question whether true informed consent is possible in contexts where cultural and social pressures are intense, making it difficult to discern whether consent is genuinely voluntary.

Debates about the impacts of criminalising FGM/C suggest that this can stigmatise affected communities, drive the practice underground, or lead to girls being cut at a younger age, all potentially increasing harm. Criminalisation can also result in people avoiding medical treatment for problems unrelated to FGM/C, because they fear that their cut status will be revealed, leading to prosecution. Bioethics calls for a balanced, critical approach that respects cultural diversity while protecting individual rights, particularly the rights of children to bodily integrity and autonomy.