The continued divinity of government
Through Wunlit, certain SPLA commanders were able to assert their authority to wield power to command or withhold peace. Garang refused to sanction Wunlit. Its initiators directly approached Salva Kiir – the then regional commander. He decided to support the peace process and guarantee security for Wunlit despite Garang’s reluctance. For Kiir, there were various possibilities and advantages to making peace with the western Nuer. The war between Riek and Matip in the western Nuer had made it politically necessary for Riek to seek support in the South, and Kiir’s internal SPLA position would benefit from Riek being more aligned to Kiir than to Garang. The wars also meant that his supporters were desperate for refuge in the Dinkalands. This, in itself, became part of Garang’s concern that Kiir was no longer submissive to his leadership, and this escalated into a heated meeting in Rumbek in 2004.
Kiir clearly asserted his power to make peace through Wunlit. Before Wunlit, Salva Kiir spent nearly two days meeting with the Presbyterian leaders of the process to work out security issues in the Dinkalands.1 Chiefs of Dinka and Nuer Stir Crowds, Emotions and Perform Rituals – Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference (NSCC, 1999), page 6, www.sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=SLPD19990220-01&e=-------en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-----------, accessed 13 December 2022. He also gave them soldiers to guard them day and night, ostensibly as a sign of their status and to prevent crowds. In the pre-Wunlit exchanges, Salva Kiir had guaranteed Nuer chiefs’ security when they visited Bahr el Ghazal, and had also encouraged Dinka chiefs to go to Nuer areas.2 Ibid., page 5. Kiir explicitly reminded the chiefs that the peace process would fail without their reciprocal display of trust after Nuer chiefs had visited Bahr el Ghazal. Kiir sent them despite the complex security arrangements in the western Nuer and the fighting between Nuer forces that controlled the area.
In addition, in the opening speeches of Wunlit, Kiir made it clear that he would take punitive measures against Dinka who had raided Nuer cattle in order to prevent revenge. He was explicitly willing to use military force to enforce the peace. The government, not explicit divine authorities, was the force behind peace. At the Wunlit meeting, the SPLA was explicit that it should take the ‘back seat’ and allow the chiefs to talk.3 Nhial Deng Nhial, Wunlit – Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference (Wunlit: NSCC, 1999), page 8, www.sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=SLPD19990200-01, accessed 11 December 2022. However, commanders and governors of the SPLA gave speeches that opened the conference. While their presence might have been needed for security, it also created a peace-making space that was SPLA-controlled. The Wunlit conference was pro-peace, Kiir’s SPLA was visibly in support of peace and it was unclear if there was any political space to oppose peace. Therefore, the Kiir-controlled part of the SPLA and its government effectively asserted their power to demand peace (however arbitrarily) and therefore assert their divine-like nature (in Graeber’s sense).
At the same time, government powers did potentially feel threatened as the NSCC grew in authority through its role in peace-making. In November 2000, the NSCC held a meeting called ‘Strategic Linkages’ in Wulu and then, in June 2001, a further meeting in Kisumu (Kenya). The SPLM refused to endorse this meeting, possibly as they felt challenged when the church’s mandate to bring peace and reconciliation now appeared to be empowering people and the church.4 Ashworth and Ryan, ‘“One Nation from Every Tribe, Tongue and People”’, page 57. The message of the Kisumu gathering was to support the war with GoS but to criticise the division between Riek Machar and John Garang. The two doctors reconciled soon afterwards and it was claimed that ‘the Kisumu conference was a major factor’.5 Ibid.
In such an account, through the church, people and chiefs gained power to push back against the logics of government and wars of elites.
 
1      Chiefs of Dinka and Nuer Stir Crowds, Emotions and Perform Rituals – Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference (NSCC, 1999), page 6, www.sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=SLPD19990220-01&e=-------en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-----------, accessed 13 December 2022. »
2      Ibid., page 5. »
3      Nhial Deng Nhial, Wunlit – Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference (Wunlit: NSCC, 1999), page 8, www.sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=SLPD19990200-01, accessed 11 December 2022. »
4      Ashworth and Ryan, ‘“One Nation from Every Tribe, Tongue and People”’, page 57. »
5      Ibid. »