Emotions and Evidence: Cultivating Trust and (Mis)Deciphering Trustworthiness

The Stasi’s tactics of exploiting relationships of trust blurred the lines between trust and mistrust and further intensified the tensions between the cognitive and affective facets of trust. Just as they used the performance of trust in their relationships with informants, Stasi officers also often explicitly told IMs to build trust with people they informed on as they were more likely to access and acquire personal and political information that way. Indeed, the ability to win people’s trust was an asset that the Stasi sought after and praised in their informants.5See Betts, Within Walls, 46. Examples of this are abundant. Lewis writes, for instance, that the MfS described Paul Gratzik, who would become IM “Peter,” as “having the necessary ability to work with young people and as knowing ‘how to win their trust.’”6Lewis, A State of Secrecy, 28. Similarly, IM “Marion,” Paul Wiens’s daughter Maja, was deemed useful because she had “‘won the trust of several operatively known actively hostile persons and was producing extensive operatively significant information and evidence in the course of the operation.’”7Cited in Lewis, A State of Secrecy, 126. An assignment document for Anderson/“David Menzer” in 1980 indicates that trust in these contexts was to be built on the pretence of naturally developing friendship—“auf der Grundlage von natürlichen Möglichkeiten, die Sie aus dem bisherigen Kennenlernen erarbeitet haben” (on the basis of natural opportunities that you have acquired in the process of becoming acquainted).8Assignment document for IMS “David Menzer,” dated December 16, 1980, 135. This, in turn, was a mechanism of secrecy intended to conceal any trace of the Stasi’s involvement. Anderson was explicitly instructed to establish this personal connection with his target “nur auf der Basis von vertraulichen Gesprächen. Das Ziel muß sein, daß Sie ein Vertrauensverhältnis herstellen und das [sic] daraus weitere Möglichkeiten ableiten lassen, was Sie dann zur Abschöpfung operativ interessanter Informationen nutzen können” (on the basis of confidential conversations only. The goal must be to establish a relationship of trust and enable further options to emerge from this, which you can then use to extract information of operational interest).9Assignment document for IMS “David Menzer,” dated December 16, 1980, 135. When IMs followed these orders and did their job effectively (from the Stasi’s point of view), their betrayal of their target was both a betrayal of interpersonal trust and a betrayal of knowledge gained through trust.

The deliberate building of trust in order to exploit targets and gain know ledge was a counterpart to the notorious tactics of Zersetzung, which included the deliberate cultivation of distrust (to undermine existing bonds of trust). The Stasi’s dealings with Klaus Schlesinger and Bettina Wegner illustrate this dual approach. The OV “Schreiberling” files reveal that Schlesinger was a direct target of their tactic of deliberately sowing seeds of doubt, suspicion, and mistrust, as we noted in chapter 1. Alongside allowing him to travel, this included further detailed plans to conjure suspicion that he was spying for the MfS—for example, through anonymous letters both to him and his acquaintances in West Berlin—and to push him, in turn, to suspect and accuse others of spreading such rumours.10Plan for long-term political-operative “Zersetzung” measures in OV “Schreiberling” and other focus procedures of department XX/7, dated January 18, 1978, esp. 38–40. Meanwhile, with the opening of her files, Wegner, like countless others, discovered that someone she had assumed to be a close friend—whose real identity Wegner did not reveal in the interview with Windsor—had in fact been an unofficial informer “von recht übler Art” (of the really bad kind), as Wegner put it.11Interview with Bettina Wegner, August 23, 2021. Reading the file revealed to Wegner that the IM’s specific “Legende,” the cover story concocted by the Stasi to gain access to knowledge about her, depended on the performance and cultivation of trust: “sie sollte mir ein Konzert in Leipzig verschaffen, mit mir dahinfahren und Vertrauen aufbauen, und versuchen, Freundinnen zu werden. Hat alles geklappt” (she was supposed to get me a concert in Leipzig, go there with me and build trust, and try to become friends. It all worked out).12Interview with Bettina Wegner, August 23, 2021.

Wegner and Schlesinger were not only targets of complementary Stasi tactics but can also be seen as representatives of both sides of a dialectic of trust and mistrust in the GDR literary sphere: Wegner adopted a stance of radical trust and openness, while Schlesinger resorted to radical distrust and vigilance. Reports in the files make repeated references to Schlesinger’s tendency to distrust those around him—perhaps because of the Stasi’s direct interventions to this end. The same files—as well as Wegner’s retrospective interview—suggest that she, like Maaß, was generally inclined to be more trusting of others, despite the climate of uncertainty, and even to be wary of excessive mistrust. In one instance, described by an IM with the code name “Vera,” the IM reports having to tread carefully in conversation with Schlesinger, Wegner, and another acquaintance because “Schlesinger reagiert auf jede Frage mit Mißtrauen” (Schlesinger reacts to every question with suspicion).13Summary report by IM “Vera” on the development of her contact with Wegner and Schlesinger since early February 1976 (OV “Schreiberling”), dated March 26, 1976, 103. In a discussion about the future of Wegner’s event series “Kramladen,” which was being monitored by the Stadtrat für Kultur, Schlesinger reportedly warned his then wife not to underestimate one particular colleague, suggesting ‘“der arbeitet bestimmt für die Staasi! [sic]”’ (he probably works for the Stasi!).14Summary report by IM “Vera” about the development of her contact with Wegner and Schlesinger, dated March 26, 1976, 104. According to IM “Vera,” Wegner objected to this claim and retorted: ‘“Du immer mit Deinem übertriebenen Mißtrauen. Bei Dir ist ja jeder zweite ein Spitzel der Staasi [sic] … Natürlich haben die Ohren überall, aber ich glaube eher, die sitzen unter den Besuchern”’ (You, with your constant exaggerated distrust. For you, every second person is an informant for the Stasi … Of course they have ears everywhere, but I think they are sitting among the visitors).15Summary report by IM “Vera” about the development of her contact with Wegner and Schlesinger, dated March 26, 1976, 104. The key issue here is not whether Wegner or Schlesinger were correct in their intuitive assumptions but rather the openness with which they exchange that uncertain knowledge about the nature of the Stasi’s presence (which is not doubted per se) and the way they each navigate that uncertainty. We also see Wegner’s inclination to think the Stasi threat was most likely to come from a secondary circle, in this case the audience, than their immediate network, and her belief that mistrust could be just as ill-founded and potentially counterproductive as trust.

The reports from IM “Vera” suggest that her relationship with Wegner was also based on a close friendship (though she is almost certainly not the IM Wegner refers to in her interview with Windsor). In the aforementioned report, “Vera” notes that their conversation not only covered Wegner’s difficulties with the “Kramladen” and Schlesinger’s writing and travel plans, but also what she called general topics like health, children, and other everyday worries. Their private encounters at Wegner and Schlesinger’s home often lasted until late into the evening. On one occasion, when Schlesinger was out, “Vera” had no trouble asking Wegner about the content of manuscripts that her then husband had left lying around: “da ist sie ohne Mißtrauen bereit, Auskunft zu geben ganz im Gegenteil zu Schlesinger selbst” (she’s prepared to give information without mistrust, quite the opposite of Schlesinger himself).16Summary report by IM “Vera” about the development of her contact with Wegner and Schlesinger, dated March 26, 1976, 107. Even in a situation where IM “Vera” felt her relationship with Wegner had cooled, this was attributed to Schlesinger’s influence and a wider crisis following the couple’s involvement in protests against Biermann’s expulsion, rather than a breakdown of trust:

Wegner’s approach to trust is arguably an exemplary case of trust as an intuitive and affective attitude resting on interpersonal dependence. At the same time, it bears the seemingly paradoxical hallmarks of trust as a “strategic decision to take a risk in the condition of uncertainty,” based on “non-rational” and “incalculable elements.”20Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies, 15. Our emphasis. In her interview with Windsor, Wegner recalls reading in a report by the aforementioned unnamed IM that the task of befriending Wegner had been straightforward because “die Wegner ist so vertrauensdusselig” (Wegner is so gormlessly trusting).21Interview with Bettina Wegner, August 23, 2021. The IM’s language, as recalled by Wegner, is derogatory and suggests naivety or stupidity, even irrationality, on Wegner’s part. By contrast, Wegner herself commented that “vertrauensselig” (blissfully trusting) would have been a more appropriate word:

The ambivalent interplay between the emotional and cognitive dimensions of trust and mistrust can also be seen in the contrast between Kolbe’s relationship with his biological father, Ulrich, who was deployed from the beginning of the OPK initiated in 1981 (though his interventions in his son’s life may have begun earlier) under the code name FIM “Werner Weber,”23Nowroth, “Schutzraum Familie?,” 122. Nowroth notes that there was some variation in the code name used; in early documents, for example, he appears as IM “Hans Weber” which Nowroth assumes to be an error. and his relationship with another close male figure, Peter Mugay, who Kolbe later described as a “väterliche[r] Freund” (fatherly friend)24Kolbe, “Uwe Kolbe über IM Albert alias Peter Mugay,” 33. Kolbe used the same term in his interview with Windsor. and who reported on Kolbe as IM “Albert” from around 1984, ostensibly, he would later claim, because he wanted to protect him after his mentor Franz Fühmann had passed away.25Interview with Uwe Kolbe, June 1, 2021; Kolbe, “Uwe Kolbe über IM Albert,” 35. As we saw in chapter 1, Kolbe had long held suspicions—and believed to have what he referred to as “alle Indizien” (all indicators)—that his father worked for the MfS, although he could never be certain, and often confronted him about it. In those moments of confrontation, when Kolbe voiced his distrust openly, his father attempted to proffer (false) counterevidence of his trustworthiness. For example, Kolbe recalled his father arguing that he could not possibly work for the Stasi because his (Ulrich’s) mother and four siblings lived in West Germany which made him unsuitable for such a role.26Interview with Uwe Kolbe, June 1, 2021. See also Kolbe, “Die Sache mit V.,” 152. Nadine Nowroth states that “Werner Weber’s” FIM file is replete with examples of how he tried to dispel his son’s suspicions.27Nowroth, “Schutzraum Familie?,” 134. In one report, “Werner Weber” noted that Uwe Kolbe’s suspicions had probably been fuelled by “eine dritte Person” (a third person), a stage technician at the Mecklenburg theatre, where rumours had circulated about his involvement with the MfS. Furthermore, Kolbe had found his father’s “legendierte [sic!] Tätigkeit beim Aufbau-Verlag … immer wieder unglaubwürdig … nachdem der ihm bekannte Verlagsleiter ihm gegenüber eine Bekanntschaft mit mir verneinte und später ‘sich erinnerte’” (cover-story about working at the Aufbau publishing house … increasingly unbelievable … after the publishing director, whom he knows, denied knowing me only to “remember” later on).28IM “Werner Weber” cited (without date) in Nowroth, “Schutzraum Familie?,” 134. The involvement and utterances of third parties is instructive here: Kolbe seemed more inclined to trust the knowledge circulating as rumours passed on by the stage technician and make inferences from the publishing director’s initial “mistake” than he was to believe his father. To counteract this, “Werner Weber” reported that he had written Kolbe a strongly worded letter and claimed that this kind of direct attack, as he put it, had previously proved effective in improving their relationship, which meant, by extension, greater access to information (from his son).29IM “Werner Weber” cited (without date) in Nowroth, “Schutzraum Familie?,” 135.

Another report records an encounter when Kolbe directly broached the issue of mistrust. On this occasion, “Werner Weber’s” assignment had been to visit his son in Prenzlauer Berg, not long after Kolbe had been denied permission to travel to the West.30Report by “Werner Weber” (not marked as IM here) on Uwe Kolbe, dated September 22, 1981. According to “Werner Weber,” his son showed “eine deutliche Zurückhaltung” (a clear reticence) and addressed him in a friendly tone but with “sehr massiv vorgetragenen Mißtrauen” (heavily laid-on mistrust), remarking sarcastically that his father must surely have known that he was actually not in Berlin at all, but had been in Tübingen/FRG for two days already.31Report by “Werner Weber” on Uwe Kolbe, dated September 22, 1981, 154. In response, “Werner Weber” once again went on the offensive:

These examples certainly demonstrate “Werner Weber”/Ulrich Kolbe’s deception and manipulation of their father-son relationship. At the same time, these interactions illustrate the tactics FIM “Werner Weber” was compelled to adopt in order to retain, or regain, even the tiniest element of his son’s trust. If there were to be any semblance of trust in Kolbe’s attitude to his father, then some form of counterevidence was required to offset the signs that made him suspicious in the first place. This, in turn, gives insight into Kolbe’s navigation of the uncertainty surrounding his father’s collusion with the SED and GDR state. Despite his scepticism and suspicions, Kolbe seemed most receptive, however cautiously and superficially, to his father’s feigned yet partial honesty about his ideological and paternal concerns when this was performed as a frontal assault of openness, based on arguments that seemed to contain a degree of plausibility. This is not to suggest that Kolbe naively interpreted that openness as evidence of his father’s trustworthiness, but rather to point to his alertness and apparent responsiveness to both emotional arguments and seemingly rational indicators of trust and distrust in their fraught relationship. This ambivalence surrounding (dis)trust correlated with the instability of Kolbe’s knowledge of his father’s intentions and complicity in the state’s surveillance apparatus.

In contrast to his relationship with his father where the issues of trust and distrust were confronted at least partially openly, Kolbe claims to have had a kind of “Urvertrauen” (basic trust) in Peter Mugay (IM “Albert”), an unconditional trust that he had shown no-one else, and which he had not questioned until after the opening of the files.35Kolbe, “Uwe Kolbe über IM Albert,” 34. Even then, it took some time before his trust fully dissipated and he garnered the evidence he required to establish that it was Mugay behind the alias “Albert”: “IM Albert war offenbar jemand, der viel von mir wußte, eine Art Familienmitglied. Erst die Veröffentlichung einer Karteikarte in Focus im August 1993 half mir auf … Aber ich steckte den Kopf in den Sand. Ich wollte einen eigenen Beweis, einen offiziellen der Gauck-Behörde …”36Kolbe, “Uwe Kolbe über IM Albert,” 33. (IM Albert was obviously someone who knew a lot about me, a kind of family member. It was only the publication of an index card in Focus in August 1993 that helped me … But I stuck my head in the sand. I wanted my own proof, official proof from the Gauck authority …). As more documents came to light, it became clear that this IM knew “verblüffend viele Details” (an astonishing amount of detail) about Kolbe’s travels, love life, work projects and schedule.37Kolbe, “Uwe Kolbe über IM Albert,” 34. Mugay had such privileged access and enjoyed Kolbe’s trust to such an extent that the “information” he passed on to the MfS—“ein hübsches Psychogramm” (a nice psychogram) as Kolbe put it—could not always be used operationally because it would have blown his cover. We might say that Mugay sometimes had too much knowledge gained through too much trust to operate effectively in secret.

Alongside the palpable anger about Mugay’s betrayal of the knowledge acquired through their relationship of trust, Kolbe speculates retrospectively about the reasons for his incautious openness towards this man in particular. Mugay lived next door to his mother and stepfather in Prenzlauer Berg and was at that time editor of Neue Zeit, the official newspaper of the East German CDU: