Uses of culture in anti-FGM/C campaigns
Heavy use is made of notions of culture in FGM/C eradication campaigns by local and international NGOs and agencies. Some of these are far removed from the traditional culture they purport to mimic. I have previously argued (Hughes 2018) that it is nonsensical to include, in ARP public ceremonies, the cutting of large iced cakes, the use of beauty queens in heavy make-up and mini-skirts as anti-FGM/C ambassadors, candlelit ceremonies, beauty contests for initiates (and so on), and present these as manifestations of culture which derive from ‘traditional’ beliefs and practices. The new events are cultural in the wider sense, of course, but in many respects they do not mimic traditional rites.
It may be more useful to describe FGM/C, in non-judgmental language, not as a primarily cultural phenomenon but as a component of customary behaviour which is believed to have a transformational function, and upgrades girls and mothers to higher strata. Marriage and childbearing upgrade women further; FGM/C is regarded by its proponents as the first step in that incremental process (Esho, Enzlin and Van Wolputte 2013). Initiation ritual as a whole involves practices rooted in social reproduction and the development of personhood. Females do not belong to age-sets in age-organised societies like the Maasai, Okiek, and Samburu, but the social upgrading that flows from initiation is the closest they get to it. Communities like the Kikuyu, though not generally regarded as age-organised, also used initiation to raise the status of girls and women.1 Pers. communication by email with Tatu Kamau, Dec. 2023. Historian Godfrey Muriuki also confirms that this was the case historically among Kikuyu (pers. communication).
References to culture in the literature on ARP and FGM/C can be muddled and unsubstantiated. For example, there is no evidence to support this sweeping claim:
The fact that a large number of girls have participated in the alternative rite, that many such events have taken place, and that the ceremonies can be implemented with relatively little or no opposition, indicates clearly that the approach is programmatically feasible, is culturally acceptable, and that there is demand for it.2 Chege, Askew and Liku 2001:5. (My emphasis.)
On the contrary, there is abundant evidence that ARP is not widely embraced, opposition exists, families are pressured to ‘supply’ girls, and demand tends not to come from the grassroots but from NGOs, and adults who stand to gain financially from their participation in ARP programmes (Hughes 2018; Mepukori 2016; Prazak 2007; Kamau, Chapter 12 of this volume).3 An interesting new trend is emerging among urban middle-class parents who send their daughters to ARP-style camps run by churches or commercial companies. Adverts can be seen posted around Nairobi for ‘rites of passage’ camps. One company advertises ‘Becoming a modern princess. Alternative Rite of Passage Camps’. My thanks to Celia Nyamweru and Milcah Gikunyu for information. Studies and NGO reports often claim that ARP has become culturally acceptable, without providing empirical evidence. Here are other examples: ‘[ARP] is a socially acceptable means that takes girls through all the traditional and cultural processes …’ (Mbogo et al. 2019:26). And this: ‘Since the initial ceremony in Meru, the alternative rites-of-passage approach has gained community acceptance’ (Muteshi and Sass 2005:28). However, the girls who participated in those early ARPs were apparently not monitored later, and the original data is not available, hence this claim is unconvincing.4 These earliest ARPs were organised by PATH (Programme for Alternative Technology in Health) and Maendeleo ya Wanawake (MYWO), a women’s development organisation. I have asked MYWO several times if the original data is archived and available to researchers, but had no reply. Chege et al., who studied these ARPs, note that ‘systematic baseline data were not collected’ (2001:6). Yet praise for these ARPs, and unsubstantiated claims of their success, is commonplace in the literature, e.g. ‘The approach has shown evidence of success among a significant portion of the targeted group of young women …’, Toubia and Sharief (2003, seen online). An Amref paper on CLARP (a community-led model of ARP, see Chapter 13) asserts: ‘CLARP has been positively received by the Maasai community’ (Muhula et al. 2021:2; Amref Health Africa 2020). But this only refers to its reception in two sub-counties of Kajiado. Finally: ‘Alternative rites facilitate community ownership and support, as they maintain key cultural practices’ (Matanda, Groce-Galis et al. 2021:55, my emphasis). In my view, they do nothing of the kind. Moreover, the rites do not facilitate community ownership and support; on the contrary, they require this.
Evidence shows that some girls undergo ARP more than once, choosing to take part again partly because the experience is exciting and rewarding (Oloo, Wanjiru and Newell-Jones 2011). Girls in Samburu are known to have attended ARPs run by different NGOs within days of each other (Mepukori 2016:61). NGOs are aware that some ARP initiates have already been cut, or are cut soon afterwards.
The ‘saved’ trope
Citing the fact of the intervention as evidence of its success is illogical. But that is what development agencies and NGOs constantly do, when they claim that x number of girls have been ‘saved from FGM/C’ simply as a result of having attended an ARP.5 Similar claims are made for other interventions, such as public declarations, community surveillance mechanisms, and mobile tracking apps. UNFPA-UNICEF admit that public declarations are ‘largely symbolic or ceremonial’ (2020:32), while simultaneously flagging their alleged effectiveness. Try googling ‘girls saved from FGM by alternative rite’ and up come dozens of examples, such as: ‘To date 30 alternative rites of passage ceremonies have been held with 14,000 girls saved from FGM’ (Osur 2020). Or this: ‘Through Amref Health Africa’s ARP programs, over 17,000 girls have been saved from FGM/C’ (Amref 2019). Attributing the change to ‘community surveillance mechanisms’ rather than ARP, the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme claimed: ‘216,853 girls were saved from being subjected to FGM in 2021’ (UNFPA-UNICEF 2022:8, 9). Similar claims appear in many of these agencies’ reports. The Joint Programme also attributes reduced incidence to public declarations, which are integral to most ARP final ceremonies, and to community surveillance systems (described as non-formal protection systems) established following declarations, without explaining how either works to produce such a result. Only long-term monitoring can prove whether these girls avoided FGM/C or not. Graamans et al. (2019:2) have also questioned the ‘saved’ trope, calling it an ‘oversimplification’.
 
1      Pers. communication by email with Tatu Kamau, Dec. 2023. Historian Godfrey Muriuki also confirms that this was the case historically among Kikuyu (pers. communication). »
2      Chege, Askew and Liku 2001:5. »
3      An interesting new trend is emerging among urban middle-class parents who send their daughters to ARP-style camps run by churches or commercial companies. Adverts can be seen posted around Nairobi for ‘rites of passage’ camps. One company advertises ‘Becoming a modern princess. Alternative Rite of Passage Camps’. My thanks to Celia Nyamweru and Milcah Gikunyu for information. »
4      These earliest ARPs were organised by PATH (Programme for Alternative Technology in Health) and Maendeleo ya Wanawake (MYWO), a women’s development organisation. I have asked MYWO several times if the original data is archived and available to researchers, but had no reply. Chege et al., who studied these ARPs, note that ‘systematic baseline data were not collected’ (2001:6). Yet praise for these ARPs, and unsubstantiated claims of their success, is commonplace in the literature, e.g. ‘The approach has shown evidence of success among a significant portion of the targeted group of young women …’, Toubia and Sharief (2003, seen online). »
5      Similar claims are made for other interventions, such as public declarations, community surveillance mechanisms, and mobile tracking apps. UNFPA-UNICEF admit that public declarations are ‘largely symbolic or ceremonial’ (2020:32), while simultaneously flagging their alleged effectiveness. »